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DEAD CANARIES IN THE COAL MINES: THE
SYMBOLIC ASSAILANT REVISITED
Jeannine Bell*
ABSTRACT

The well-publicized deaths of several African-Americans-Tamir
Rice, Philando Castile, and Alton Sterling among others-at the
hands of police stem from tragic interactions predicated upon
well-understood practices analyzed by police scholars since the
1950s. The symbolic assailant, a construct created by police scholar
Jerome Skolnick in the mid-1960s to identify persons whose
behavior and characteristics the police view as threatening, is
especially relevant to contemporary policing. This Article explores
the societal roots of the creation of a Black symbolic assailant in
contemporary American policing. The construction of AfricanAmerican men as symbolic assailants is one of the most important
factors characterizing police interaction with African-American
males. This is not a one-size-fits-all approach to Blackness. As the
Article discusses, police officers' treatment of African-American
women is also fraught, and in some cases police treat Black women
in a way that, while still disparaging, is markedly different from the
way that Black men are treated. I argue that current strategies for
ending police violence do not sufficiently address the prominence of
the symbolic assailant in proactive policing strategies. This Article
suggests an unusual solution to commonly understood mechanisms of
* Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington. A.B.
Harvard College, 1991; J.D. University of Michigan, 1999; Ph.D. (Political Science) 2000. This article
was presented in draft at U.C. Berkeley, Duke, and the University of Wisconsin law schools. It was also
presented at the Lutie Lytle Conference at the University of Michigan. Sincere thanks to participants at
talks where it was presented. Special thanks to Akwasi Owusu Bempah, Kevin Brown, Blanche Cooke,
Joe Hoffmann, Leandra Lederman, Aviva Orenstein, Kate Bartlett, Trina Jones, Ralf Michaels, Jonathan
Simon, and Jeff Stake. I am grateful to Kayla Frye, Joey Pellegrino, and Aminta Moses for research
assistance. Sincere thanks to Sarah Armstrong, Mary Beth Boyer, Rita Eads, and Stacey Chandler for
secretarial assistance.
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addressing police violence. Based on my experience with police who
had productive relationships with crime victims of color, I suggest a
reorientation of policing practices predicated on a more reactive
model of policing.
INTRODUCTION

Since police officer Darren Wilson shot Michael Brown in August
2014,' the media has reported a number of lightning-fast shootings
by police after they receive a 911 call reporting that an individual is
carrying a gun. 2 One of the most publicized cases occurred in
November 2014 and involved twelve-year-old Tamir Rice. 3 Rice was
playing with an airsoft-type gun4 outside the Cudell Recreation
Center on Cleveland's West Side.5 Responding to a 911 call
reporting an individual in the park carrying a gun, two Cleveland
police officers reported to the scene. 6 Officer Timothy Loehmann
shot Rice twice at point-blank range within two seconds of arriving at
the location.7 Though Cleveland police officers are trained in first
1. Kashmira Gander, Michael Brown Shooting: What Happened in Ferguson?, INDEPENDENT
(Aug. 11, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/michael-brownshooting-what-happened-in-ferguson-10450257.html [https://permacc/4U4T-MUPH].
2. Kimberly Kindy & Marc Fisher, Year ofReckoning: Police Kill Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST
(Dec. 26, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-ofreckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/?utmterm=.1ea638496ebb [https://perma.cc/3D9L-THEA].
3. See TIMOTHY J. McGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER
22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 2 (2015),
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf prosecutor/enUS/Rice/o20Case%20Report/20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6WP-GCXS ]
(discussing the events surrounding the shooting of Rice).
&

4. Tierney Sneed, Police Shootings Involving Toy Guns Spur Push for Regulation, U.S. NEWS

REP. (Nov. 28, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/28/after-johncrawford-and-tamir-rice-ohio-lawmaker-seeks-to-regulate-toy-guns. Airsoft guns, which shoot plastic
pellets, are not manufactured to kill or injure. Jacob Gurney, Law Enforcement Trainfor Active Shooter
Situation, ADVERTISER-TRIB. (July 23, 2017), http://www.advertiser-tribune.com/news/localnews/2017/07/law-enforcement-train-for-active-shooter-situation. Though some may resist calling them
toys, they are used for play by children, for adult recreation, and also for law enforcement training
exercises. Id
5. McGINTY, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Id. at 4.
WORLD

7. Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police,

Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamir-riceshooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-
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aid, Loehmann made no effort to try to save Rice's life. Rice died
the next day. 9
When they receive a report of a gun, police do not always respond
by shooting. Consider the case of E.J. "Junior" Walters, which
occurred about a month before Rice was shot, on October 23, 2014,
just a few states away from Ohio in Church Hill, Tennessee. 10
Walters, a White man who had previously been arrested for road rage
against a detective, cursed at two individuals and accosted them with
a pistol tucked into his belt." One of the victims called 911 and gave
a description of Walters.1 2 Officer David Benton observed Walters,
who was reportedly not wearing his seatbelt as he drove his car, cross
the centerline several times. 13 Officer Benton then signaled for
Walters to stop the car and approached Walters' car on foot. 14
Because of the 911 report of the gun, Benton asked Walters to exit
the car." Walters allegedly refused, and Benton, accompanied by
several other police officers, physically removed Walters from the
vehicle and arrested him. 16 No shots were fired.17
These two incidents display drastically different approaches to 911
reports of a male with a gun. In the first, a Black youth with what
was essentially a toy gun was shot two seconds after police arrived at
the scene.1 8 In the second incident, a middle-aged White man with a
one.htmlmtrref-www.google.com&gwh=C63C1 14ElAE2A39EC690B9F28767EE26&gwt-pay
[https://permacc/42HK-HFPC].
8. Id See also McGINTY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
9. Id at5.
10. Jeff Bobo, Man Accused of Accosting Detective in August Arrested Againfor Road Rage with a
Gun, KINGSPORT TIMES NEWS (Oct. 23, 2014, 4:21 PM),
http://www.timesnews.net/News/2014/10/23/Man-accused-of-accosting-detective-in-August-arrestedagain-for-road-rage-with-a-gun [https://perma.cc/K9JW-XTYH].
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id; see also Hawkins Man Arrested in "Road Rage" Toward Deputy, ROGERSVILLE REV.
(Sep. 3, 2014), http://www.therogersvillereview.com/news/article_92dl 786e-32e7-1 1e4-96cb0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/RED4-EKLP].
15. Bobo, supra note 10.
16. Id
17. See id.
18. McGINTY, supranote 3, at 4; Hear the 911 Call About Tamir Rice: Gun is 'Probably Fake,'
Caller Says, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
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history of assaulting police officers, who threatened someone with an
actual firearm, ignored police orders to step out of the car and was
taken into custody without officers discharging their weapons.' 9
Officers' duty to the public, and to themselves, is to preserve life.
In keeping with this goal, one might assume that officers base the use
of force they employ on the level of danger presented by the
situations that they encounter. Take the two situations reported above
involving Tamir Rice and E.J. Walters. Considering all the facts of
each case known to the two officers as they approached the
potentially dangerous situations, one might have assumed that the
second case, involving Walters, was more threatening than the case
involving Rice, and thus required a higher level of force. In Walters'
case, the actions known to the officer included the behavior of the
suspect and the criminal history of violence.2 0
The two different outcomes-the violent man with a history of
assault and known for threatening both police officers and civilians
escaping harm,21 and the twelve-year-old without a record being shot
dead instantly 22 -seem inexplicable. Pure racism on the officers' part
is just too simple an explanation for their behavior. The overall
purpose of this Article is to explain the difference in the Ohio and
Tennessee officers' behavior by placing each of the reactions to the
suspects squarely in the context of policing. For both Black and
White suspects, the outcomes in their treatment depend heavily on
how racialized policing has developed in the twenty-first century.
The roots of the explanation for the difference in police behavior
lie deep within constructs that have developed over the last fifty
years. One of the most important constructs in this regard is the
concept of the symbolic assailant identified by Jerome Skolnick in
the mid-1960s.2 3 In this Article, I argue policing constructs
tamir-rice-911-call-20141126-htmlstoiy.html [https://perma.cc/PB6K-XEZ3]. The 911 caller suggested
that the gun might be a toy, but this was not relayed to police. Id.
19. Bobo, supra note 10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. McGINTY, supra note 3, at 4.
23. JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 45-46 (4th ed. 2011).
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developed in response to the idea of the Black symbolic assailant are
crucial factors in the difference between officers' approaches to Rice
and to Walters. Given police practices that have developed
undergirded by the idea of the symbolic assailant, I contend that the
instantaneous police shooting of Tamir Rice was predictable. At the
same time, the "kid gloves" approach to Walters was understandable.
Though police practices around the country have worsened toward
African-Americans since the 1960s, when the concept of the
symbolic assailant was born, in the Article, the idea of the symbolic
assailant still has a practical life in police department procedures
around the country.2 4 The symbolic assailant provides a working
explanation for police behavior in a wide variety of cases involving
African-Americans. That being said, I argue that the symbolic
assailant-a useful concept in its day-has come unmoored from its
original empirical underpinnings, particularly with respect to
African-Americans. Recent shootings of African-Americans by the
police-and other rarely discussed racialized policing activities-are
clear signs that "Blackness" has become the symbolic assailant.
This Article will proceed in the following manner. In Part I, I will
describe the fifty-year-old concept of the symbolic assailant, an
important organizing feature in how scholars have understood police
work. Part II will address the idea of race and the symbolic assailant,
using research on discriminatory policing practices from around the
country to emphasize transformation of the symbolic assailant over
the last fifty years. I argue that, due in part to the adoption of
"Broken Windows" policing, police practices with respect to the
symbolic assailant have undergone a transformation since the late
1960s. What was once a layered, empirical approach to policing
24. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA

1116-70 (2d ed. 2000). The authors discuss various racialized police practices that collectively have
worsened toward African-Americans since the 1960s to today. Id. Some of these police practices include
the following: (1) the unequal use of excessive force, which ranges from the use of chokeholds to the
use of weapons; (2) the unequal enforcement of stop and frisk policies; (3) disparate traffic stops and
disparate searches of those vehicles once stopped: (4) the unequal enforcement of quality of life crimes,
such as public nuisance and loitering offenses; (5) the disparate use of search warrants; and (6) the use
of racial profiling. Id.
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discrete situations has become a narrow concept relying exclusively
on the race of the suspect, often to the exclusion of other factors
commonly associated with good policing. Part III will focus on
solutions aimed at displacing the centrality of the symbolic assailant
in policing practices.
I.

The Creation of the Symbolic Assailant
A.

The Sociology ofPolice Work

Since the mid-1950s, those who study the police have struggled to
understand the conditions under which officers carry out their duties.
Empirical work examining police officers, who face the task of
maintaining order and insuring citizens' compliance with the law,
particularly in the midst of constitutional limits on the use of force.2 5
Police difficulty in balancing the challenge of maintaining order
while enforcing the law is compounded by the vagueness of the legal
dictates which they are charged with enforcing. 26
In deciding whether to enforce the law against citizens, police
scholars have also identified police discretion-the ability of police
to decide whether to invoke the law-as critical.2 7 Police discretion
not to enforce the law is largely accepted because of the assumption
that resources prevent the enforcement of the law in every
circumstance in which it is violated.2 8 For instance, Egon Bittner's
investigation of the policing of "skid row" revealed that patrol
officers coped with the difficulty of maintaining order not by
invoking the law, but rather by relying on a richly particularized
knowledge of the people in the area and using an aggressively
personal approach in scrutinizing individuals. 29 In this regard, the

25. JEANNINE BELL, POLICE AND POLICING LAW xi (2004).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the CriminalProcess: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration ofJustice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 546-86 (1960).
28. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 86 (1996).
29. Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid Row: A Study of Peacekeeping, 32 AM. Soc. REv. 699, 714
(1967).
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officers' behavior may have been in conflict with constitutional
protections. 30 Nonetheless, officers defended their behavior by
insisting that their response was appropriate given the particular
norms of the ("skid row") society they were policing. 3 1
Using data collected by the American Bar Foundation, Joseph
Goldstein studied the manner in which police officers elect not to
enforce the law in three discrete contexts: (1) drug laws; (2) cases of
felony sexual assault; and (3) gambling laws. 32 Goldstein found that
33
there are many situations in which police do not follow the law.
This is not a minor issue. Police decisions to not enforce the law may
undermine legislative intent and are largely invisible-unseen by the
public, not subject to judicial scrutiny or to public policy debates. 34
Goldstein cited the significance of not enforcing the law, ultimately
because police behavior in this context "largely determines the outer
limits of law enforcement." 35
Police discretion to enforce the law is an issue of utmost
importance to a democratic government. Most democracies, the
United States included, mandate equal application of the law.36 This
is particularly true in criminal law, where punishment can result in a
financial penalty or the loss of one's freedom. 37 If the law that is
ultimately enforced is determined by police discretion, it is critical to
discern which groups, if any, are disfavored and tend to find
themselves the subject of police scrutiny.
In democratic societies, there is an ideological conflict between the
order that officers are charged with maintaining and the rules
requiring accountability to the rule of law. This conflict means that
the police must serve in alternate roles as rule enforcers, fathers,
friends, social servants, moralists, street fighters, marksmen, and
30. See id. at 714-15.
31. Id. at 715.
32. Goldstein, supra note 27, at 554.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 550-51, 562.
35. Id. at 543.
36. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 3d plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/67/L.1 (Sept. 19, 2012).
37. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 53, 63-64
(2003).
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officers of the law.3 8 The result is a perfect storm for officers'
diminishing adherence to legal rules. Officers' stake in maintaining
their authority, their socialization, and the pressure to find violators
of the law, combined with the invisibility of the work they perform,
all mean that the law is less likely to be followed.3 9
B. The Role ofRace in Policing
Police scholars studying the role that race plays in policing quickly
established that African-Americans have been subjected to racially
discriminatory policing. Some of the earliest socio-legal research,
undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s, revealed that the police enforced
the law differently in Black communities than they did in White
communities.4 0 One example of this research deals with police
attitudes toward minorities. Researchers have found that police
officers, the majority of whom are White, hold biased views about
African-Americans.4 1
There is significant contemporary data showing widespread racial
discrimination in policing practices documented both by the Justice
Department and by police scholars.42 Since 2010, the Justice
Department's "pattern or practice" investigations have found racial
discrimination in police departments around the country, including:
East Haven, Connecticut; Beacon, New York; Orange County,

38. SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 17.
39. Id. at231.
40. George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., CTR. CiviC INNOVATION, Do Police Matter? An
Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms, 22 MANHATTAN INST. Civic REP. 1, 1-2
(Dec. 2001).
41. See, e.g., VICTOR E. KAPPELER, RICHARD D. SLUDER, & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, FORCES OF
DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING 53 (2d ed. 1998); John Van Maanen, The
Asshole, in POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 221 (Peter K. Manning & John Van Maanen eds.,

1978); Jennifer Hunt, Police Accounts of Normal Force, 13 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 315, 315
(1985);
Police Department Race and Ethnicity Demographic Data, GOVERNING.COM,
http://www.governing.com/gov-datalsafety-justice/police-department-officer-demographics-minority-

representation.html [https://perma.cc/5RS7-CQUC] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
42. E.g., Sendhil Mullainathan, Police Killings of Blacks: Here Is What the Data Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/upshot/police-killings-of-blacks-what-the-datasays.html [https://perma.cc/TL3N-2YLE].
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Florida; Warren, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; New Orleans, Louisiana;
Missoula, Montana; and Seattle, Washington.4
One of the most recent pattern or practice investigations occurred
in Ferguson, Missouri. The Justice Department found that the
Ferguson police treated African-Americans differently at every level.
They were arrested more. 44 They got more tickets. 45 They were even
bitten by police dogs more. 46 Of the fifteen times Ferguson police
dogs bit people, all were African-American victims. 47
In studying police practices in cities and towns around the country,
scholars found that the practices used by police officers in Ferguson,
Missouri, existed in other places as well. Numerous studies have
found significant racial disparities in police stops all over the United
States.4 8 These racial disparities are important because of the breadth
of locales in which they were discovered.
Police scholars have identified significant racial disparities in
police stops in large, racially diverse American cities such as New
York 49 and Los Angeles.5 0 Racially discriminatory policing,
43. CIVIL RIGHTS Div. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION'S PATTERN AND PRACTICE

POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT (2017). Rather than being considered a full list, these cities
should be considered the tip of the iceberg. This list does not include cities like Detroit, whose consent
decrees started before 2010. See generally United States v. Detroit, No. 03-72258, 2014 WL 197730
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2014). The list also does not include places like Oakland, where 100 plaintiffs in a
single lawsuit argued that police violated their rights. See generally Allen v. Oakland, No. 3:00-cy04599-TEH (N.D. Ca. Jan. 27, 2012). Relying exclusively on the Department of Justice (DOJ)
determination that there is a pattern and practice of racialized policing is also likely to miss many cities
where there has been a problem. For instance, Stephen Rushin argues that the DOJ has been far too
conservative. Stephen Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 1343, 1347, 1415-16 (2015).
44. Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, The 12 Key Highlightsfrom the DOJ's Scathing Ferguson
Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/03/04/the-12-key-highlights-from-the-dojs-scathing-fergusonreport/?utm_term-.023aafl74dcf [https://perma.cc/AY2G-WEZL].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. "Despite making up 67% of the population, African Americans accounted for 85% of FPD's
traffic stops, 90% of FPD's citations, and 93% of FPD's arrests from 2012 to 2014." Id.
48. Ted. R. Miller et al., Perils of Police Action: A Cautionary Tale from US. Data Sets, 23 PAC.
INST. FOR RES. & EVALUATION 1-4 (2016); Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of
Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 835 (2003);
Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial
Profiling,54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1098-99, 1102-03, 1106 (2005).
49. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL POLICING CANNOT WORK 13
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however, is not limited to a particular area of the country. Though
such procedures may be less surprising in Southern states like
Louisiana,5 ' they also occur in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
regions of the country, 52 as well as Midwestern cities like Wichita,
Kansas,53 and St. Louis, Missouri.54 Finally, the type of police
department is not necessarily determinative of finding racially
disparate treatment. Police scholars have identified racial disparities
in investigative stops conducted by established, traditional, ethnic
departments like that of Boston,55 and progressive reform-oriented
police departments in the Kansas City area. 56
Racially biased policing is at odds not only with the legal mandate
for equal protection but also with social norms prescribing tolerance.
In the next section, I argue that such policing can be understood as
part of the characterization of the symbolic assailant first identified
by police scholar Jerome Skolnick in the 1960s as one of the
explanations for police behavior.

(2002); Andrew Gellman, Jeffrey A. Sagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police
Department's "Stop-and-Frisk"Policy in the Context of Claims of RacialBias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N
813, 814 (2007); David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing
Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength?:
The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 147 (2014);
Michael D. White, Preventing Racially Biased Policing Through Internal and External Controls: The
Comprehensive Accountability Package, in RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL

READINGS 468, 482-83 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
50. See IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN
THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 5 (2008).

51. Jim Ruiz & Matthew Woessner, Profiling, Cajun Style: Racial and DemographicProfiling in
Louisiana's War on Drugs, 8 INT'L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 176, 186 (2006).
52. See, e.g., PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW
TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 26-27 (1999).

53. Brian Winthrow, Race-Based Policing: A Descriptive Analysis of the Wichita Stop Study, 5
POLICE PRAC. & RES. 223, 223-24 (2004).
54. Jeff Rojek, Richard Rosenfeld & Scott Decker, The Influence of Driver'sRace on Traffic Stops
in Missouri, 7 POLICE Q. 126, 135 (2004).
55. Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling:Evidencefrom the Boston
Police Department,91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 163 (2009).
56. Ian Cummings, NAACP's Warning of Racial Profiling, Abuse in Missouri Gives Would-Be
Travelers Pause, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 3, 2017, 5:10 PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/articlel65307012.html [https://perma.cc/GE72-KEUK].
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The Symbolic Assailant

In his book, Justice Without Trial, Jerome Skolnick describes the
symbolic assailant, its origins, and the extent to which police
57
orientation toward criminals is a critical factor in policing. The idea
of a symbolic assailant stems from the policeman's view of the
world. 8 Because police officers' work required them to be occupied
continually with potential violence, they developed shorthand for the
kinds of people whose gesture, language, and attire the officers
59
recognized as a prelude to violence.
Skolnick's construction of the symbolic assailant was grounded in
his observations of police work in the 1960s. 60 In this context, police
work involved officers patrolling the neighborhood and reacting to
threats. 6 1 Threats played a critical role because they were
omnipresent, animating every single encounter. This meant that
protecting the officer from danger was of paramount importance.
According to Skolnick, officers learned to associate particular
situations and types of individuals with danger. 6 2
His work stressed that the particular personal history of the suspect
the officer encounters is not important to the construction of whether
the suspect is seen as suspicious. 6 3 In fact, he writes that a suspect's
personal history is immaterial.64 The symbolic assailant need only
suggest danger either through display of a weapon or "insolence in
65
the demeanor" signaled by the way one walks or dresses.
Individuals who were potentially dangerous fit into a range of
categories.' Skolnick, who focused on police officers' jobs in
general, gives a long list of potential activities which the police are

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See generally SKOLNICK, supra note 23.
Id. at 42.
Id at 43.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 47.
See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
See id. at 46-47.
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taught to use as markers of suspicion.67 Some of the situations which
officers were taught to consider suspicious, and should warrant field
interrogations, include the following:
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)
(11).
(12)
(13)
(14)

Suspicious persons known to the officer from
previous arrests, field interrogations, and
observations.
Emaciated appearing alcoholics and narcotics
users who invariably turn to crime to pay for the
cost of their habit.
Person who fits description of wanted suspect as
described by radio, teletype, and daily bulletins.
Any person observed in the immediate vicinity
of the crime very recently committed or
reported as "in progress."
Known troublemakers near large gatherings.
Persons who attempt to avoid or evade the
officer.
Exaggerated unconcern over contact with the
officer.
Visibly "rattled" when near the policeman.
Unescorted women or young girls in public
places, particularly at night in such places as
cafes, bars, bus and train depots, or street
corners.
"Lovers" in an industrial area (make good
lookouts).
Persons who loiter about places where children
play.
Solicitors or peddlers in a residential
neighborhood.
Loiterers around public restrooms.
Lone male sitting in a car adjacent to school

67. See id at 45-46.
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grounds with newspaper or book in his lap.
(15) Lone male sitting in a car near shopping center
who pays unusual amount of attention to
women, sometimes continuously manipulating
rear view mirror to avoid direct eye contact.
(19) Uniformed "deliverymen" with no merchandise
or truck.
(20) Many others. How about your own personal
experiences? 68
Personal history is irrelevant to the symbolic assailant as Skolnick
constructs him. In other words, for the purposes of the symbolic
assailant, it does not matter whether the designee has a criminal
history. Because the officer is constructing and deciding that an
individual is a symbolic assailant prior to running the individual's
criminal history, a long criminal history has the same impact as an
individual with no prior convictions. 69 All that matters is how the
situation looks to the officer. Appearance is everything. Skolnick
writes:
Nor, to qualify for the status of symbolic assailant, need an
individual ever have used violence. A man backing out of a
jewelry store with a gun in one hand and jewelry in the
other would qualify even if the gun were a toy and he had
never in his life fired a real pistol. To the policeman in the
situation, the man's personal history is momentarily
immaterial. There is only one relevant sign: a gun
signifying danger.70
In both the conception of the symbolic assailant and the list of
potentially suspicious activities from the training manual that
68. Id at 46.
69. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 46.
70. Id at 46.
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Skolnick quotes, officers' experiences play an important role in their
construction of the symbolic assailant. For instance, take the final
category in the list, which insists there are many other circumstances
that are suspicious and calls officers to reflect on their own personal
experiences dealing with suspects.7 1 In general terms, the nature of
the characteristics in the list are detailed and specific-they seem to
narrow the markers of suspicion to a small set of situations in which
a crime may have occurred in the past. Because police experience is
understood to be absolutely critical in identifying suspicion, by using
the phrase "many others," the writer acknowledges that the list
cannot capture every suspicious circumstance. 72
D. Some Are More Suspicious than Others: Race and the
Symbolic Assailant
Skolnick's characterization of the symbolic assailant does not
mention race at all. That being said, Skolnick quickly acknowledges
the fact that police officers in Westville and most other communities
have come to identify the Black man with danger.7 3 He suggests this
perspective comes from the isolation faced by White patrolmen
policing Black neighborhoods. 74 He quotes James Baldwin on the
isolation that develops because of the tasks with which White
policemen in Black neighborhoods are charged:
The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive. None
of the Police Commissioner's men, even with the best will
in the world, have any way of understanding the lives led
by the people they swagger about in twos and threes
controlling. Their very presence is an insult, and it would
be, even if they spent the entire day feeding gumdrops to
children. They represent the force of the white world, and
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
See id at 50.
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that world's criminal profit and ease, to keep the black man
corralled up here, in his place. The badge, the gun in the
holster, and the swinging club make vivid what will happen
should his rebellion become overt.
Baldwin's description of the interaction between law enforcement
officers and African-Americans derives from lived experience.
Baldwin expects officers to behave in a particular manner because of
who they are (White police officers) and the environment in which
they are charged with enforcing the law (Black neighborhoods).7 6 At
least in the passage that Skolnick quotes, Baldwin is sympathetic
both to the fact that Blacks are resentful of police presence, and to
police officers' worries regarding danger in policing a group of
individuals who are suspicious of police as an "occupying" force.7 7
II. The Rise of "Intuition" in Police Work
At the same time that Skolnick was studying the police in
Westville, the administration of President John F. Kennedy was
gearing up for a war on crime.78 Kennedy, Jonathan Simon writes,
saw crime as a powerful way to cement the relationship between the
chief executive and the public. 79 Building this relationship required
investment in police and other infrastructure. 80 President Kennedy
said, "Crime has to be repressed and communities must be
protected .... But we should be pouring as much, or even more,

money, manpower[,] and imagination in preventing those early law
violations that start criminal careers." 81

75. SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 49.
76. See id.
77. See id
78. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 49 (2007); see also SKOLNICK, supra note

23, at 13.
79. SIMON, supra note 78, at 51.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
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Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with little exception,
Congress and the Executive Branch kept the nation focused on
crime. 82 In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act.8 3 In addition to issuing wiretapping authority to the
Executive Branch, the legislation also authorized $50 million in
funds to local police departments to fight crime. 84 The Johnson and
Nixon administrations escalated the war on crime by funding
improvements in law enforcement and changing the criminal law in
more punitive ways.8 5 President Ronald Reagan appointed former
trial prosecutor Ed Meese as Attorney General.86 Meese attacked and
tried to undermine Warren Court decisions like Mirandav. Arizona,8 7
which helped to establish that criminal defendants were
constitutionally entitled to procedural protection.8 8
A. Broken Windows
It was in this environment, in 1982, that the Atlantic Monthly
published George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson's article Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.89 Wilson and

Kelling's article called for the return of police to the community
through increasing foot patrols and investigations of low-level

82.

See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33, 234, 242

(2011).
83. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1984)).
84. Id.; NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960-1993 61
(1994).
85. See STUNTZ, supra note 82, at 238-39.
86. Debra Cassens Moss, The Policy and Rhetoric of Ed Meese, 73 A.B.A. J. 64, 64 (1987); Attorney
General: Edwin Meese, III, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/meese-edwin-iii
[https://perma.cc/CQA2-MW6S ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
87. See Moss, supra note 86, at 64.
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 n.33 (1966) (extending the right to counsel to police
interrogation).
89. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/PH5V-DVJA]. The effectiveness of Broken Windows has been
criticized on empirical grounds. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272-75
(2006).
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crime. 90 Wilson and Kelling used the metaphor of a broken window
in a neighborhood building, which is left unrepaired and untended, to
show the link between disorder and crime. 91 They surmised that
when a window is left in this state, the rest of the windows will soon
be broken because disorder gives rise to the perception that further
disorder is costless. 9 2
Under the Broken Windows theory, disorder begets urban decay,
which begets criminal invasion. This chain could be broken with the
installation of a skilled foot patrol officer to maintain order. 9 3 The
article places heavy reliance on the assumption that the presence of
foot patrol officers, familiar with neighborhood regulars, will
alleviate the anxiety that crime will occur due to an "untended"
appearance.9 4 After elucidating why order is so crucial, Wilson and
Kelling posit how best to maintain it. They call for an increase in foot
patrols and the prevention of minor offenses, noting that motorized
patrol officers are inhibited by a barrier, which distances officers and
makes them an alien force within the community.9 5
At its base, the philosophy of Broken Windows requires that police
search neighborhoods where significant disorder-petty crimes,
vandalism, etc.-exists and address it, rather than leave it alone. 9 6 In
the policing context, an important, if not critical, fact in combatting
crime involves finding lawbreakers. In focusing on disordered
neighborhoods, departments around the country fixated on minority
neighborhoods where the investigation of low-level crime morphed
into the low-hanging fruit of "stop and frisk." 97 Ultimately,
departments focused on whomever the police could find as they

90. Kelling & Wilson, supranote 89.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 89; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A
Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and OrderMaintenancePolicingNew York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 305-06 (1998).
97. See, e.g., Reed Collins, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New
Crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 419, 419-22 (2007).
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canvassed neighborhoods looking for those responsible for the
disorder that plagued these spaces. 9 8
B. Broken Windows "On the Ground"
Broken Windows policing was adopted by police departments
around the country.99 One of the most famous examples was New
York City. In 1989, George Kelling began working with the New
York Transit Authority to apply Broken Windows policing to
vandalism that was occurring on the New York City subways.100 In
1994, when William Bratton-who had worked with Kelling as the
head of the New York City Transit Police-became head of the New
York Police Department (NYPD), he made Broken Windows a part
of standard police practice for city police.' 0
1. EvaluatingBroken Windows' EmpiricalClaims
The original Broken Windows article was based on scant empirical
evidence. 102 As could have been expected, scholars and policy
makers quickly moved to investigate Wilson and Kelling's basic
claim that general disorder leads to more serious crime."0 ' One of the
most significant criticisms of this policing practice is that the Broken
Windows method of policing has done little to reduce serious
crime.1 04
98. Id
99. See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 89, at 272 (stating that New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles have all adopted some aspect of the Broken Windows theory).
100. Kelling & Sousa, supranote 40, at 2.
101. Id; see also Lauren Kirchner, Breaking Down the Broken Windows Theory, PAC. STANDARD
(Jan. 7, 2014), https://psmag.com/breaking-down-the-broken-windows-theorybbe9cO6ae2a2#.tuo8pxyv6 [https://perma.cc/Q9ZD-A5QD].
102. Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 89, at 273.
103.

See WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S

TOP COP

REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 177-78, 180 (1998) (explaining that proactive policing strategies
significantly reduced serious crime); see also Kelling & Sousa, supra note 40, at 10 (arguing that over
60,000 violent crimes were prevented by Broken Windows policing).
104. Elizabeth R. Groff et al., Does What Police Do at Hot Spots Matter? The PhiladelphiaPolicing
Tactics Experiment, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 23, 43-45 (2015) (explaining that foot patrols led to no
significant reduction in crime); Kenneth J. Novak et al., The Effects of Aggressive Policingof Disorder
on Serious Crime, 22 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 171, 186 (1999) (finding that
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Professors Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig argued that not only
is Wilson and Kelling's supposition that the policing of minor
offenses reduced serious crime unfounded, but there is a strong
relationship between the rate of arrests for minor offenses and an
increase in crime rates."os The research specifically reviews the
changes in crime during the 1980s and 1990s in New York City,
which had adopted a form of Broken Windows policing. 106 The
research found:
[T]he pattern of crime changes across New York City
precincts during the 1990s that Kelling and Sousa attribute
to broken windows policing is equally consistent with mean
reversion: those precincts that received the most intensive
broken windows policing are the ones with the largest
increases and levels of crime during the city's crack
epidemic [of the mid-to-late 1980s]. Consistent with
findings elsewhere from city-level data, jurisdictions with
the greatest increases in crime during this period tend to
experience the largest subsequent declines as well. 107
Accordingly, this change is likely an effect of the "most intensive
broken windows policing."1 08 However, Ludwig and Harcourt found
no evidence proving that Broken Windows policing reduces' either
the amount or rate of violent crimes. 109
2. Broken Windows Claps Back
Though William Bratton, New York City's Police Commissioner,
firmly supported Broken Windows policing, critical re-examination
of Broken Windows and police practices in New York came on July
police
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

actions play no role in reducing robbery and burglary).
Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 89, at 296.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id
Id. at 316.
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17, 2014, after Staten Island police officers Justin D'Amico and
Daniel Pantaleo accosted Eric Garner, a Black man they suspected of
selling loose cigarettes. 1 0 The officers struggled with Garner, who
argued with the officers and refused to cooperate.' 1 One of the
officers eventually used a chokehold on Garner, which, along with
chest compressions used to subdue him, killed Garner." 2 Both the
chokehold (a practice prohibited by police department policy) and
Garner's multiple complaints that he could not breathe were caught
on cell phone video by a bystander and widely broadcast." 3
Selling loose cigarettes is not a serious crime. The officers who
killed Garner were acting in response to a crackdown on so-called
quality-of-life crimes.114 After Garner's death, George Kelling
defended the Broken Windows theory, arguing that Broken Windows
received a bad reputation because it was considered a high-arrest
theory."s He claimed that Broken Windows is not meant to increase
the number of arrests made.11 6 Instead, the increase has simply been
the result of police exercising that type of policing."' Kelling, along
with Bratton, wrote an article on the public perception of Broken
Windows and why New York needed to keep it."'
110. Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric
Garner's Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/ericgarner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7RP6-77SU].
111. Se; id
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. George Kelling, Don't Blame My 'Broken Windows' Theoryfor Poor Policing, POLITICO (Aug.
11, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/broken-windows-theory-poor-policingferguson-kelling-121268 [https://perma.cc/G5SY-WYZ5]; see also Katherine Beckett, The Uses and
Abuses of Police Discretion: Toward Harm Reduction Policing, 10 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 77, 83-84
(2016) ("In sum, recent decades have witnessed the emergence of (at least) two pronounced efforts to
shift police organizations' focus toward what were formerly considered relatively unimportant issues
and to encourage a more aggressive response to them. The result has been a sharp increase in the arrest
and incarceration of drug law violators and misdemeanants generally. And as is now well-known, both
of these developments, especially the war on drugs, contributed importantly to the development of mass
incarceration and to pronounced racial disparities throughout the criminal justice system.").
116. Kelling, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. See generally George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Why We Need Broken Windows Policing,
CITY J. (2015), https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-we-need-broken-windows-policing-13696.html
[https://perma.cc/TCL6-A5GV].
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Following Garner's death, the public in New York did not show
much support for New York City police and their Broken Windows
policing."' About 90% of African-Americans and 71% of Latinos
did not approve of the way the police handled Garner's situation.1 20
Additionally, the overall approval rating of the NYPD fell by 9%.121
Despite those numbers, Kelling still seemed to believe that minorities
living in New York supported Broken Windows policing. Kelling
maintained:
[E]ven in this highly charged context, support for Broken
Windows remained high. African-Americans supported it
by 56[%] to 37[%] .. ., whites by 61[%] to 33[%] . . ., and
Hispanics by the largest margin of all--64[%] to
34[%] .... The poll results reflect the underlying public
support from all races for this kind of enforcement.1 22
In addition to demonstrating public support, advocates of Broken
Windows also have had to respond to challenges on effectiveness
grounds. One study examining policing practices over a twenty-year
period found that, in areas policed more assertively, the crime rates
were much lower.1 23 Kelling and Bratton maintained:
In 1993 New York's murder rate was 26.5 per 100,000
people. Since 1994, when Broken Windows policing was
put into practice citywide, crime has fallen further, faster
and for longer than anywhere else in the country. Today the
largest and densest city in the U.S. has a lower murder rate,
at four per 100,000, than the nation's 4.5 per 100,000. In
1993 New York accounted for about 7.9% of U.S.
homicides; last year the city's share was 2.4%. These
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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striking figures are emblematic of broader, historic declines
in crime.124
In his defense of the program, Kelling also tried to dispel the idea
that Broken Windows is the equivalent of, or contributes to, stop,
question, and frisk (SQF).1 25 An SQF is a "tactical response based on
reasonable suspicion of possible criminality."l2 6 In contrast, Kelling
and Bratton describe Broken Windows policing as "a more broadly
based policy mandating that police will address disorderly illegal
behavior, such as public drinking and drug use, fights, public
urination, and other acts considered to be minor offenses, with
responses ranging from warning and referral to summons and
arrest." 27 Accordingly, they equate the standard for Broken
Windows as being closer to a probable cause standard-a higher
standard than reasonable suspicion. 128
3. Targeting Through "Intuition"-BlackMen Become the
Symbolic Assailant
As discussed below, current policing practices-routine behaviors
that police officers train for, put into practice, and are later rewarded
for-establish African-American men as symbolic assailants: always
suspicious and always potentially up to no good. To be clear, it is not
that any of the practices described are harmful in and of themselves.
As described below, the racialization of particular practices makes
them harmful. In concrete terms, police and members of the public
124. William Bratton & George L. Kelling, The Assault on 'Broken Windows'Policing, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/william-bratton-and-george-kelling-the-assault-on-brokenwindows-policing-1418946183 [https://perma.cc/23ZZ-AYCY].
125. Kelling & Bratton, supra note 118 ("An SQF is based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. An officer observes someone, say, going from car to car
looking into the windows. Exercising discretion, the officer decides whether to stop the person for
questioning. If he suspects that the subject is armed and dangerous, he may frisk him by conducting a
pat-down of his outer clothing. If the officer detects an object that may be a weapon, he may reach into
the subject's pocket.").
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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read Black men as being suspicious when they are engaged in
ordinary behavior-walking to school, walking in their
neighborhood, walking in a neighborhood that may look like their
own, driving the speed limit, etc. Behaviors that are not considered
suspicious when engaged in by Whites are worthy of investigation
when Black men engage in them.
The police construction of the African-American symbolic
assailant is even more pernicious than simply attaching
suspiciousness to being Black. The White symbolic assailant that
Skolnick identified was only suspicious; suspicion led to
investigation-questioning or other verification before police used a
high level of force. 129 Black symbolic assailants-all Black men and
even some Black youths-are not just suspicious, but also
threatening. This prompts police to use deadly force to subdue Black
men about whom they have little, if any, actual evidence of
lawbreaking or dangerousness, who are unarmed,' 3 0 have their hands
raised in surrender,' 3 ' are subdued by multiple officers,1 32 or are
running away. 3 3 When facts are disclosed, when bystander video is
released, and when the coroner bags the body of the innocent Black
man, police deploy the idea of the Black man as threatening to make
the shooting seem reasonable and appropriate.1 34
SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 46-47, 227.
130. Sherri Lee Keene, Victim or Thug? Examining the Relevance of Stories in Cases Involving
Shootings of Unarmed Black Males, 58 How. L.J. 845, 851-53 (2015).
131. Id. at 852.
132. Baker, Goodman & Mueller, supra note 110; Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South
Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mansdeath.html [https://perma.cc/4PS4-DK9E]. A South Carolina police officer, Michael Slager, shot and
killed Walter Scott. Id. Scott was unarmed and running away from Slager at the time that he was shot
and killed. Id
133. Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 132.
134. The media's disproportionate coverage of Ferguson's reaction to Michael Brown's shooting,
rather than the shooting itself, exemplifies this idea. See WESLEY LOWERY, "THEY CAN'T KILL US
ALL": FERGUSON, BALTIMORE, AND A NEW ERA IN AMERICA'S RACIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 8-9 (2016)
("Yet another police shooting in a working-class black neighborhood, even the breaking of a young
black body left on public display, didn't catch the gaze of the national media. It was the community's
enraged response-broken windows and shattered storefronts-that drew the eyes of the nation."); see
also Holly Yan, Joshua Berlinger & Faith Robinson, Baton Rouge Officer: Alton Sterling Reachedfor a
2
Gun Before He Was Shot, CNN (July 13, 2016, 7:59 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/1 /us/police-

129. See
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Though the idea of the symbolic assailant originated in the
policing of Whites, the symbolic Black assailant is very different
from Skolnick's original concept.13 5 As the concept was identified
and delineated by Jerome Skolnick, the facts and circumstances in
which an individual finds him or herself are what makes an
individual suspicious. 13 6 Are you waiting in a deserted area at night?
Are you dressed as a delivery person but do not have a truck? Are
you a lone male sitting in a car near a playground with a book in your
lap? Skolnick suggests that each of these behaviors is considered
suspicious to the police. 3 7 For each of the items, however, note how
fact-specific they are. In other words, context is everything.
Contrast the level of detail needed in Skolnick's original
formulation of symbolic assailant-location, behavior, and activity
are all considered-1 38 with the lone requirement for the Black
symbolic assailant-Blackness. Though it did not provide a Fourth
Amendment remedy, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
constitutional issues involved with attaching suspicion to someone's
race. 139 Use of the symbolic assailant by police is a shortcut. The
downside of using any shortcut to identify criminal behavior is that
an individual who is innocent may be accused.
Additionally, the impact of the symbolic assailant shortcut on
Whites and Blacks varies quite dramatically. Consider the following:
A White male college student goes to the park to finish his
homework. He finds a parking spot near the toddler playground and
begins reading. This wholly innocent behavior, while unusual, is
suspicious, given Skolnick's characterization.' 4 0 As a symbolic
White assailant, police practices are to investigate, question the
suspect, and allow his answers to either confirm or deny the officer's

shootings-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/NVX3-8W43].
135. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 45-46.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 46.
138. Id. at 45-46.
139. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
140. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 45-46.
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suspicion.14 1 The innocent college student is hassled by the
questioning, but he suffers no greater intrusion.
Because the Black symbolic assailant is a broader stereotypefitting all Black men regardless of age or circumstance-it is
operationally different. Critical to the symbolic Black assailant is a
series of dehumanizing stereotypes-that Blacks are criminals who
are simultaneously violent and irrational.1 42 In other words, the
symbolic Black assailant is not just a possible criminal (as in the case
of the symbolic White assailant), but is likely a dangerous criminal
who poses a threat to the officers and to others. Faced with this
potential threat, officers might not investigate or otherwise read the
situation. The symbolic Black assailant means that officers are more
inclined to respond with deadly force, regardless of whether it is
warranted.
C.

Creatinga Response to the Symbolic Black Assailant

The difference in police approaches to symbolic White and
symbolic Black assailants evolved out of specific police practices
which may or may not have had race-neutral origins. One of these
police practices was Broken Windows. With its focus on detecting
offenders in disordered neighborhoods, the Broken Windows manner
of deployment led to the mass targeting of African-Americans in
poor communities. 143 No longer was criminality tied to specific
events indicative of criminal behavior. Instead, officers could use

141. Id.
142. For a discussion of the historical development of the association between Blackness and
criminality, see KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME AND

THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 1, 4 (2010); and KELLY BROWN DOUGLAS, Introduction to
STAND YOUR GROUND: BLACK BODIES AND THE JUSTICE OF GOD XII-XV (2015).
143. Collins, supra note 97, at 426 (citing BALT. CITY COUNCIL PUB. SAFETY SUBCOMM., REPORT ON
THE POLICE PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE
PROCESS FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF ARREST WHEN No CHARGES ARE FILED 12 (Sept. 2005)) (noting

Broken Windows policing's disproportionate effect on African-Americans in Baltimore). The Supreme
Court contributed to this in Illinois v. Wardlow, a case in which the Court upheld the stop of individuals
who were fleeing in high-crime areas. 528 U.S. 119, 119-21 (2000). The Court was clear about the fact
that flight alone was not indicative of suspicious activity, but rather that such actions in a high crime
neighborhood did constitute the level of suspicion necessary for the stop. Id.
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increasingly little evidence to justify their suspicions. 1" L. Song
Richardson argues that the Supreme Court's watering down of legal
standards, such as reasonable suspicion, may have had a similar
effect on police procedures.1 45 Implicit biases also play a role. In the
absence of procedures stressing evidence-based markers of suspicion,
the empirical underpinnings of the symbolic assailant have been
transformed into a system of policing African-Americans under the
guise of being intuitively focused on issues of crime control at
large.1 4 6
Discriminatory police practices occurring in departments
throughout the United States demonstrate the evidence of AfricanAmerican men as symbolic assailants. In some cases, training the
police to see African-Americans as the symbolic assailant occurs
more openly than in other cases. One of the most vivid examples of
police practices reflecting the idea that African-Americans are
symbolic assailants was the North Miami Beach Police Department's
police practice in Florida. 14 7 In 2015, after National Guard Sergeant
Valerie Deant saw her brother's picture riddled with bullet holes at
the firing range, she discovered that the North Miami Beach Police
Department used actual mugshots of African-Americans as target
practice.1 48 Deant's brother, who completed his time in prison and
had been released, was part of an array with several other AfricanAmerican men.1 49
As the North Miami Beach Police Department target practice
implies, police departmental procedures and institutionalized
practices certainly play an important role in guiding stereotypes and
144. Collins, supra note 97, at 434.
145. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1155-64
(2012); see also David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994).
146. Richardson, supra note 145, at 1153, 1155.
147. See Fred Barbash, FloridaPolice Department Caught Using African American Mug Shots for
Target Practice, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/momingmix/wp/2015/01/16/florida-police-department-caught-using-african-american-mug-shots-for-targetpractice/?utmterm=.bafl6a3debce.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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racializing suspicion. Police researchers have documented how this
occurs systematically. Charles Epp, Stephen Maynard-Moody, and
Donald Haider-Markel conducted one of the most interesting recent
studies in this regard. In their study of more than 2,000 individuals in
the Kansas City area, conducted in the early 2000s, Epp and his coauthors found that "the structure of incentives, training, and policy in
contemporary policing makes it more likely that officers will act on
the basis of bigotry or implicit stereotypes, leading to racial
disparities in outcomes." 150
Epp and his co-authors focused on police officers' decisions to pull
cars over. They divided stops into two groups based on their
character, purpose, and justification: traffic-safety enforcement stops
and investigatory stops.1 51 They found the officers undertook trafficsafety stops primarily because the driver was speeding or engaged in
unsafe behavior. 152 They also found the officers undertook
investigatory stops when they had reasonable suspicion that the
driver was engaged in criminal activity.1 53 As the Court noted in
Whren v. United States, a case in which the driver argued he had
been stopped because of racially discriminatory pretext, pretext is
irrelevant.' 54 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, scornfully
dismisses the idea that pretext could ever matter:
It would, moreover, be anomalous, to say the least, to treat
a statement in a footnote in the per curiam Bannister
opinion as indicating a reversal of our prior law.
Petitioners' difficulty is not simply a lack of affirmative
support for their position. Not only have we never held,
-outside the context of inventory search or administrative
inspection (discussed above), that an officer's motive
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
150. CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER:
How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 7 (2014).

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 59.
Id
Id.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
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Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
contrary.1 5 5
Epp and his co-authors find that police patrol officers are taught
that the law dictates, and police departments exploit, the leeway
created by Whren.1 56 African-American drivers bear the brunt of this
doctrinal misstep.' 5 1 In their evaluation of the likelihood of being
stopped for either investigatory or traffic-safety stops, Epp and his
co-authors controlled for a variety of factors, including age, gender,
whether a driver was African-American, type of car, and how
carefully a driver followed the rules of the road.' 5 1 In traffic-safety
stops, the most important factor in determining if an individual would
be stopped was how they were driving.1 59 "The more that people
violate the traffic laws the more likely they are to be stopped,
regardless of their race, gender, age, or type of the vehicle." 60
According to Epp and his co-authors' research, the police did not
behave in a racially discriminatory manner in enforcing traffic-safety
laws; African-Americans were no more likely to be stopped in
traffic-safety stops than Whites. 1 6 1 Investigatory stops, however,
present a sharp contrast to this unbiased approach to policing. In
investigatory stops, the most important factor was the race of the
driver.' 62 African-Americans faced a 2.7 times greater risk of being
stopped than Whites, even when controlling for other factors.1 63
The construction of the symbolic assailant maps well onto Epp and
his coauthors' results. When police merely enforce traffic-safety
155. Id.
156. Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel suggest that police exploitation of Whren is
intentional. See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 35. One California
Highway Patrol Officer is quoted as bragging, "[alfter Whren the game was over. We won." Id.
157. Id. The Court is careful in Whren not to condone racial profiling. Rather, the Court insists that
claims that a stop is discriminatory must be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment (which does not
have an exclusionary rule) and not the Fourth Amendment. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
158.

Epp, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 65.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 64.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
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laws, they pay attention to how individuals drive and how far above
the speed limit they drive, and they stop violators regardless of their
racial background.1 64 In a sense, traffic-safety stops are reactive
policing at its best. Police officers actually observe the crime as it
occurs-the individual violating the traffic laws-and react to it.
When they react in this manner, they are able to police in a way that
is not racially discriminatory.
In sharp contrast to the reactive nature of traffic-safety stops,
investigatory stops are motivated not by crime control, but rather by
investigation of crime and the capture of possible offenders.' When
officers make investigatory stops, they do not catch the perpetrators
of crime red-handed, but rather use the stop as a way of evaluating
whether the individual in front of them is a criminal.1 66
When Blackness is transformed into a marker of suspicion and
threat, investigatory stops for minor crimes can become more
dangerous. In the first week of July 2016, police stopped two Black
men, Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Philando Castile
in St. Paul, Minnesota, for minor crimes. 167 During the encounters,
police shot and killed both men.1 68 When police shot Sterling, he was
unarmed and lying face down. 16 9 In Castile's case, according to his
girlfriend Diamond Reynolds (who was a passenger in the car and
witnessed the shooting), Castile was following police orders to
provide identification when he was shot."o
164. EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 65.

165. Id. at 36.
166. Id.
167. Matt Furber & Richard Pdrez-Pefia, After Philando Castile 's Killing, Obama Calls Police
Shootings 'an American Issue, 'N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/phi
lando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html?mcubz-1 [https://perma.cc/8E3N-9ZN4]; Abigail
Hauslohner & Ashley Cusick, Alton Sterling's Relatives Weather Scrutiny, Callfor Justice, WASH.
POST (July 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/alton-sterlings-relatives-weatherscrutiny-call-for-justice/2016/07/13/dbf0ba6O-490f-1 1e6-bdb9701687974517 story.html?utm term=.6f4084f8d717 [https://perma.cc/3ZFK-R4NF].
168. Furber & P6rez-Pefia, supra note 167; Hauslohner & Cusick, supra note 167.
169. Update: Police Shooting Deaths ofAlton Sterling and Walter Scott, INGLEWOOD TODAY (May 4,
28
-update-police2017), http://www.inglewoodtoday.com/index.php/breaking-news/community/item/10
shooting-deaths-of-alton-sterling-and-walter-scott.
170. Id The officer who shot Castile was ultimately charged in his killing but was acquitted. Mitch
Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017),
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Though the facts of the cases are slightly different, in both cases if
you remove the stopped individual's race, law enforcement officers
killed the men even though they did not present any significant
danger to the officers who used deadly force against them. Through
training, officers learn the legal dictates for using deadly force, and
they are normally evaluated on whether the facts demanded using a
weapon to protect themselves or a member of the public.1 7 1 Because
these men were both African-American, the mythology of the
symbolic assailant takes over. Officers no longer conduct objective
analyses of the situations they encounter. A Black men's race
becomes the reason officers stop Black men and see them as
threatening enough to shoot them multiple times, even in the absence
of the men brandishing any weapon.
D.

The Creationof the African-American Symbolic Assailant

The creation of the African-American symbolic assailant starts
early, sometimes as young as early adolescence and high school, as
Black students are criminalized and placed into the "school-to-prison
pipeline." School-to-prison pipelines plague African-American and
other minority communities.1 72 This issue starts with a high
percentage of African-American students who are suspended and
expelled from school every year. 173 Schools' strict discipline
procedures have been described as the following:
Lacking resources, facing incentives to push out lowperforming
students,
and responding
to public
misperceptions about school safety, many schools have
embraced draconian school discipline policies, including
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html
[https://perma.cc/VY9F-KT8Y].
171. MCGINTY, supra note 3, at 35.
172. Chauncee D. Smith, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating School-to-PrisonPipeline Equal
ProtectionCases Through a StructuralRacism Framework 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2009).
173. See CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOsEN & DAMON T. HEwrrr, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 2 (2010).
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[zero tolerance] rules that automatically impose severe
punishments regardless of circumstances. Although the
necessity of discipline in schools goes without saying,
schools in recent years have begun exercising their
disciplinary authority to suspend and expel students more
1 74
frequently and in far more questionable circumstances.
Many schools have implemented policing policies to discipline
students. One of the policies with the most significant effect on
African-American students was the creation of so-called zero
tolerance policies. 175 Under such policies, "[r]ates of suspension have
increased dramatically in recent years-from 1.7 million in 1974 to
3.1 million in 2000-and have been most dramatic for children of
color." 176 This type of excessively punitive disciplinary policy causes
students to enter the pipeline, and subsequently, the criminal justice
system.' 7 Often, students who fall into the pipeline do not have
78
anything else to do outside of school.1 They fall behind in their
classes, contributing to them becoming high school dropouts and
adult criminals. 1 7 9
Nationally, African-American students are expelled at a rate three
1 80
Because these students no
times higher than that of White students.
174. Id. at 2-3.
175. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LOCATING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 1 (2008),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upioad-file966_35553.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3JJ5WXA] ("Lacking resources, facing incentives to push out low-performing students, and responding to
a handful of highly-publicized school shootings, schools have embraced zero-tolerance policies that
automatically impose severe punishment regardless of circumstances. Under these policies, students
have been expelled for bringing nail clippers or scissors to school.").
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT:
2
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (Mar. 2014), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rulesforengagement/CRDC% OScho
olO/o2ODiscipline%2OSnapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V5Y-HQ8Y]; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, supranote 175 ("Many under-resourced schools become pipeline gateways by placing increased
reliance on police rather than teachers and administrators to maintain discipline. Growing numbers of
districts employ school resource officers to patrol school hallways, often with little or no training in
working with youth. As a result, children are far more likely to be subject to school-based arrests---the
majority of which are for non-violent offenses, such as disruptive behavior-than they were a
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longer attend schools, they quickly become the targets of
criminalization.' 8 ' For example, in New York, Blacks and Latinos
make up 85% of all stop and frisks, with Blacks alone making up
55%. 182 Thirty percent of all juvenile arrests are Blacks, even though
they make up only 17% of the juvenile population.1 83 Subsequently,
Blacks make up over 60% of juveniles tried and convicted as
adults.1 8 4 As far as sentencing is concerned, ". . . black youth are nine

times more likely than white youth to receive an adult prison
sentence. Cumulatively, 'black juveniles are about four times as
85
likely as their white peers to be incarcerated.'"
One of the biggest issues for students who enter the pipeline is that
"it is difficult for them to make the journey in reverse."l 8 6 Often, it is
hard for these students to re-adjust to school because many of them
have fallen behind, and there are no programs in the juvenile
detention centers to rehabilitate them. 8 7 As a repercussion, the vast
majority of students never finish high school or complete their
education.

88

Referred to as an "inter-institutional system," school-to-prison
pipelines have one particular standout problem: stop and frisk. 88 As
previously mentioned, African-Americans make up the majority of
people who are stopped and frisked.19 0 A good amount of these stops
lead to arrests, subsequent convictions, and imprisonment.' 9 1 Thus,
for those Black youths ejected from the school system either
generation ago. The rise in school-based arrests, the quickest route from the classroom to the jailhouse,
most directly exemplifies the criminalization of school children.").
181. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 175 ("Students pushed along the pipeline find
themselves in juvenile detention facilities, many of which provide few, if any, educational services.
Students of color .. .are far more likely than their white peers to be suspended, expelled, or arrested for
the same kind of conduct at school . . . ."); Smith, supra note 172, at 1011-12.
182. Smith, supra note 172, at 1012.
183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id.; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 175.
186. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supranote 175.
187. Id; KIM, LOSEN & HEwITT, supra note 173, at 3.
188.

AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supranote 175; KIM, LOSEN & HEWITT, supra note 173, at 3.

189. Smith, supra note 172, at 1014.
190. Id. at 1012.
191. Id.
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temporarily or permanently, the practice of stop and frisk is lifechanging. 1 9 2
E.

Officers' Explanationsfor Racially Biased Behavior

Unsurprisingly, police officers strongly deny a racial basis for their
behavior.19 3 Nonetheless, much of police explanations track what
police scholars have long understood about police behavior. For
instance, there is significant evidence of Jerome Skolnick's
revelation that the policeman's working personality is untrusting and
animated by fear and threat.19 4
When officers shoot unarmed Blacks, they almost always offer
explanations that identify the individuals as representing credible
threats. 195 This is true even when the facts of the situation may
suggest otherwise. For instance, the police response to twelve-yearold Tamir Rice strongly evokes notions of Rice's Blackness, rather
than his size, having transformed him into a dangerous threat. 19 6 Tim
Loehmann, the twenty-six-year-old officer who shot and killed Tamir
Rice, told another officer, "[Rice] didn't give me a chance ... [Rice]
reached for the gun and he gave me no choice." 1 9 7 As if reading from
Skolnick, Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association President, Steve
Loomis, told Politico that Tamir Rice was "menacing. He's 5-feet-7,
191 pounds. He wasn't that little kid you're seeing in pictures. He's a
12-year-old in an adult body."1'9 In response to the federal lawsuit,
192. Id.
193. Karen S. Glover, Police Discourse on Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 239, 242
(2007).
194. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 232.
195. Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Police Officers Charged in FatalShootings While on Duty:
54 Cases in the Past Decade, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post
-nation/wp/2015/04/12/police-officers-charged-in-fatal-shootings-while-on-duty-54-cases-in-the-pastdecade/?utm term-.900c436b5 155 [https://perma.cc/5L4R-7YE7].
196. See Philip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black
Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 526-28 (2014). To assume that Black children are
threatening to adults when they are just children is common behavior. See id.
197. MCGINTY, supra note 3, at 60.
198. Jonathan Capehart, It's Tamir Rice's Fault, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2015),
0
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2 15/03/02/its-tamir-ricesomitted). Consistent with the idea that Rice
marks
quotation
(intemal
fault/?utmterm-.d7d747e87e43
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Cleveland city attorneys argued that Rice caused his own death
through "the failure ... to exercise due care to avoid injury,"1 99
although he was only a preteen.
Though the original symbolic assailant is heavily contextdriven,2 00 context is irrelevant to the Black male symbolic assailantBlackness is all that matters in officers' decisions that an individual
is suspicious and in need of further investigation. The Black
symbolic assailant means that Black men-irrespective of age, class,
behavior, or contextual factors-require investigation.
The importance of the Black man being the symbolic assailant is
significant because the construct is both a marker of suspicion and an
automatic threat to officer safety. This construct proved true when
Officer Jeronimo Yanez instantly shot and killed Philando Castile
after pulling Castile over in Falcon Heights, Minnesota, on July 6,
2016.201 Officer Yanez initially indicated that Castile had been pulled
over for a cracked taillight.2 02 Audio from the police radio indicated
that, prior to the stop, officers were insisting that Castile matched the
description of a robbery suspect because of his "wide-set nose." 203 In
a similar manner, police officers in Tulsa, Oklahoma, called Terrence
Crutcher "a bad dude" as they hovered over him in a helicopter. 20 4
was a dangerous threat even after Rice was shot and mortally wounded by Loehmann, the two officers
delivered no first aid to Rice who succumbed to his wounds at the hospital the following day. Richard
A. Oppel, Jr., Police Gave Boy No Aid After Shooting in Cleveland, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/us/police-in-cleveland-boys-fatal-shooting-did-not-give-medicalaid.html.
199. Wesley Lowery, Tamir Rice Family Attorney Says 'Unbelievable' That City of Cleveland Court
FilingBlames Tamirfor His Own Death, WASH. POST (Mar. 2,2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-nation/wp/2015/03/02/tamir-rice-family-attomey-says-unbelievable-that-city-of-clevelandcourt-filing-blames-tamir-for-his-own-death/?utmterm=.862d27540c85.
200. See, e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 46-47.
201. Pat Pheifer & Claude Peck, Aftermath of Fatal Falcon Heights Officer-Involved Shooting
Captured on Video, STAR TRIB. (July 7, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/aftermath-of-officerinvolved-shooting-captured-on-phone-video/385789251/#1.
202. Id.
203. Ashley Collman, 'The Driver Looks More Like One of Our Suspects, Just Because of the WideSet Nose': Police Audio Shows Officers Thought Philando Castile Was a Robbery Suspect, DAILY MAIL
(July 12, 2016, 11:19 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3686599/The-driver-looks-likeone-suspects-just-wide-set-nose-Police-audio-shows-officers-thought-Philando-Castile-robberysuspect.html.
204. Liam Stack, Video Released in Terence Crutcher's Killing by Tulsa Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/us/video-released-in-terence-crutchers-killing-by-tulsa-
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Police video later showed that Crutcher had his hands raised and was
walking when Officer Bettye Shelby shot and killed him. 205
F. Black Women and the Police
In the previous section, I identified the symbolic assailant as a
Black male. 20 6 This paradigm does not mean that police see Black
women as innocent of criminal wrongdoing or as deserving of the
same care and concern that White women receive. In some ways,
stereotypes about Black women increase the likelihood they will be
subjected to police violence. 2 07 When police officers confront Black
gendered
women's
Black
increases
femininity
women,
vulnerability. 2 0 8 In some cases, Black women's gender may provide

them a small amount of "protection" from race-based violence, at
least compared to that which Black men face. Officers may not fear
Black women automatically or consider them suspicious or
threatening to officer safety. This perception may mean that officers
are less likely to immediately react with the highest level of force by
shooting. 209
Though the same threat level may not be present when officers
encounter Black women as when they encounter Black men, officers
do not investigate the circumstances in cases involving Black
women. The fatal cases involving Black women suggest that
although officers may see Black women as less harmful to their
police.html?_r=0.
205. Id.
206. See discussion supra Part I.D.
207. See Nnennaya Amuchie, "The Forgotten Victims" How Racialized Gender Stereotypes Lead to
Police Violence Against Black Women and Girls: Incorporatingan Analysis of Police Violence Into
FeministJurisprudenceand Community Activism, 14 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 617, 629 (2016).
208. Black women's gendered vulnerability can expose them to sexual violence at the hands of police,
as in the case of Devon Holtzclaw, a former Oklahoma police officer convicted of sexually assaulting
thirteen Black women. Dave Phillips, Former Oklahoma City Police Officer Found Guilty of Rapes,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/former-oklahoma-city-policeofficer-found-guilty-of-rapes.html?_r-0.
209. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/policeshootings-2017/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (showing that as of October 2017, seven Black women have
been killed by police so far in 2017, compared to seven hundred forty-eight total victims of police
shootings in the same time period).
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safety, officers often exercise little care or concern when interacting
with them. 2 10 In other words, officers harm and even kill many Black
women by using a high level of force to respond to situations in
which Black women are nonthreatening and mentally ill 2 1 1 or simply
refuse to follow police officers' orders.2 12
Although Black women are not seen as threats in the same way,
the lack of care and concern police demonstrate toward Black women
may result in injury or even death in situations in which women
display vulnerability, such as illness, advanced age, and when they
are in the presence of young children. For instance, in July 2014, just
weeks after NYPD officers choked Eric Garner to death, Brooklyn
police officers used a chokehold on Rosan Miller, a Black woman
who was five months pregnant.2 1 3 Miller attracted the attention of
officers because she was barbecuing in front of her house. 2 14 In
August 2014, Denise Stewart, a forty-eight-year-old Black
grandmother, responded when police knocked on her door by telling
the police they had the wrong address, but the officers dragged her
into the hallway of her apartment building half naked and held her for

210. See Al Jazeera English, Fault Lines-The Lives of Black Women, YOUTuBE (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKh2Xp0mQE. The documentary describes Betty Jones's killing
from the threshold of her home in Chicago. Id. Officer Robert Rialmo claims that he was shooting
another person in self-defense and killed Jones by accident. Id. The lawyer for the family's suit against
the city, however, presents pictures showing the doorway sprayed with bullets and a cluster of bullet
casings found twenty feet away from the home. Id. He states "[s]he never should have been placed at
risk of any injury, let alone death, when she's in her apartment and the officer knows she's there." Id.
211. See Alan Feuer, FatalPolice Shooting in Bronx Echoes One from 32 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/nyregion/fatal-police-shooting-in-bronx-echoesone-from-32-years-ago.html (describing the shootings of Deborah Danner and Eleanor Bumpers); Hetty
Chang, Woman Fatally Shot by Torrance Police Had Bipolar Disorder, NBC L.A. (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Family-of-Woman-Shot-by-Torrance-Police-Speaks-Out399604311 .html (describing the shooting of Michelle Shirley in Torrance, CA); Kate Abbey-Lambertz,
These 15 Black Women Were Killed During Police Encounters. Their Lives Matter, Too, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.con2015/02/13/black-womens-lives-matter-policeshootings n_6644276.html (describing the killings of Tanisha Anderson. in Cleveland, Miriam Carey in
Washington, D.C., and Shereese Francis in New York City).
212. See Amuchie, supra note 207, at 652.
213. KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OuR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 19 (AK Press 3d
ed. 2015).
214. Id.
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several minutes.2 1 5 Police also dragged Stewart's four children into
the hallway, handcuffing them.2 1 6
Though Stewart survived, not all Black women who encounter the
police do. In some cases, officers' reckless disregard for the welfare
of Black women leads to their deaths. For example, in July 2012,
officers reported to the home of Alecia Thomas to arrest her for child
abandonment. 217 Alecia Thomas had dropped off her children at a
Los Angeles police station because she could no longer care for
them. 218 As Officer Mary O'Callaghan arrested Thomas, Officer
O'Callaghan struck the handcuffed woman in the throat and kicked
her in the groin a number of times. 2 19 In the back of the police car,
Thomas lost consciousness and was pronounced dead soon after
arriving at the hospital.2 20 While the coroner determined cocaine
intoxication was "likely a major factor in Thomas' death," the
coroner listed Thomas' official cause of death as "undetermined"
because it was impossible to determine what role the struggle with
officers played in her death.22 1
When Black women encounter police officers, officers may treat
them as suspects, rather than victimized women. This treatment may
occur despite facts that suggest the Black woman is clearly a victim
and not a perpetrator. In a number of cases, officers reported to the

&

215. Id.; John Marzulli et al., Naked Brooklyn Woman Draggedfrom Apartment, Left Topless in
Hallway for Minutes by NYPD Officers Who Say She Beat 12-Year-Old Daughter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 1, 2014, 11:25 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/nypd-officers-drag-nakedbrooklyn-woman-apartment-video-article-1.1889292.
216. Marzulli et al., supra note 215.
217. Marisa Gerber, Arrest Video Played in Trial of LAPD Officer Accused in Woman's Death, L.A.
TIMEs (May 20, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-mary-ocallaghanopening-statements-20 1505 19-story.html.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. Although Stewart and Miller's cases did not result in officer charges, authorities charged
Thomas' assailant, O'Callaghan, with assault and convicted her on June 5, 2015. Anthony Kurzweil
Kareen Wynter, LAPD Officer Found Guilty of Assault in Arrest of Woman Who Died in Custody,
KTLA5 (June 25, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://ktla.com/2015/06/05/verdict-reached-in-trial-of-lapd-officeraccused-of-assault-in-womans-death/.
221. Id.
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scene of a domestic violence situation and ended up shooting the
Black women who were the victims of domestic violence. 222
III. The Cop inAllof Us
Police officers' treatment of African-Americans as potential
assailants, prior to any criminal background assessment or specific
facts signaling danger, is strongly at odds with criminal procedure
standards requiring individualized suspicion and with the deeply held
ideals of fairness and nondiscrimination.2 2 3 Polling data since the
1960s indicates that Americans believe individuals should be treated
equally by the police. 224 Though there are wide racial divides in
whether Americans believe that African-Americans are treated fairly
by the police, a generalized belief in equality persists nonetheless. 225
Although there is a generalized support for equal treatment under
the law, in a variety of ways, police use the symbolic Black assailant
as an idea that is fully consistent with societal notions of threat and
danger posed by African-Americans. In other words, police officers
get the idea of the African-American symbolic assailant from the rest
of us.
The African-American symbolic assailant looms large in the
American consciousness. Even though victim surveys reveal most
Whites crime victims are victimized by White perpetrators,2 2 6 when
Whites want to describe themselves as a victim of crime, the assailant
222. E.g., Kirsten West Savali, Aura Rosser: Police Kill Mich. Woman After Responding to Domestic
Violence Call, NEWSONE (Nov. 13, 2014), https://newsone.com/3070659/aura-rosser-police-kill-michwoman-after-responding-to-domestic-violence-incident/; Claire Scholl, Woman Killed in Oxnard Officer
Involved Shooting Identified, KEYT (Mar. 20, 2015, 8:54 AM), http://www.keyt.com/news/venturacounty/woman-killed-in-oxnard-officer-involved-shooting-identified/65274203; Fred Clasen-Kelly, The
Seconds Before the Shots, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 21, 2015, 7:46 PM), http://www.charlotteobser
ver.connews/local/crime/articlel5728675.html; Austin McCoy, Viewpoint: One Year Since Aura
Rosser's Death and StillNo Justice, MICH. DAILY (Nov. 5, 2015, 7:38 PM), https://www.michigandaily.
com/section/viewpoints/viewpoint-one-year-aura-rossers-death.
223. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 37, at 92-95.
224. See generally Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, Deep Divide Between Black and White Americans
in Views of Criminal Justice System, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (May 7, 2015),
http://publicreligion.org/research/2015/05/divide-white-black-americans-criminal-justice-system/.
225. Id
226. See, e.g., KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 102-07 (2d ed. 2009).
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that they dream up is someone Black.2 2 7 Two famous cases include
those of Charles Stuart and Susan Smith. In 1989, Stuart told Boston
police that he and his wife Carol were on their way home from a
Lamaze class when a Black man wearing a jogging suit stopped their
car. 228 Stuart claimed an assailant with a raspy voice forced his way
into their car at a stoplight, ordered him to drive a short distance
away, and robbed them.229 The assailant allegedly then shot Charles
in the stomach and Carol in the head.23 0
At least initially, creating a fictional Black robber worked quite
well for Stuart. After his police report, police bulldozed their way
through Mission Hill, a predominantly Black neighborhood, and
rounded up several Black men for a lineup. 23 1 Stuart picked a Black
man who he insisted most resembled the attacker. 23 2 Upon further
investigation, the police shifted their focus to Charles Stuart, who
233
committed suicide rather than face arrest.

Susan Smith is another example of someone who fictitiously
blamed a Black assailant for a crime that she committed. Smith, a
mother of two, notified authorities that a man stole her car and
kidnapped her two small children. 23 4 The race of the man that she
5
claimed kidnapped her children was African-American. 23 Smith
went to the media pleading for the safe return of her missing
children, launching national concern for them.236
It took Susan Smith over a week to confess. 23 7 She only did so
after authorities had become suspicious of her story.2 38 Smith
227. Id. at 98-101, 106-07.
228. JOE SHARKEY, DEADLY GREED: THE RIVETING TRUE STORY OF THE STUART MURDER CASE
THAT ROCKED BOSTON AND SHOCKED THE NATION 111, 141 (2017).
229. Id. at 140.
230. Id.
231. Don Terry, A Woman's False Accusation Pains Many Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/06/us/a-woman-s-false-accusation-pains-many-blacks.html.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Harrison Cahill, Susan Smith: 20 Years Later, Case Still a Shocker, STATE (Oct. 18, 2014, 6:48
PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/articlel3900058.html.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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confessed that she allowed her car to roll into a lake.2 39 She
confirmed this by taking the authorities to the spot where her children
drowned and where police then found their bodies.24 0 Smith did not
explain her reasoning behind naming a Black man as the culprit. 241
Katheryn Russell-Brown has identified crimes like the Stuart and
Smith murders as racial hoaxes. 242 Russell-Brown defines racial
hoaxes as situations in which either "[an] individual fabricates a
crime and blames it on another person because of his or her race; or
[an] actual crime has been committed and the perpetrator falsely
blames someone because of his race." 243
Russell-Brown scoured news sources and other documents and
was able to identify sixty-two racial hoaxes, in which Whites
identified Blacks as the assailant, occurring between 1987 and
2006.244 She insists that the sixty-two cases she identified are most
likely an undercount.2 4 5 Interestingly enough, 12% of the cases
Russell-Brown identified involved police officers or some other
judicial officer-judges, prosecutors, and court deputies. 246
Though the cases of Charles Stuart and Susan Smith are the most
famous cases of racial hoaxes, several other cases in the interim have
been extremely well-publicized. 247 In 2008, the twenty-one-year-old
239. Id.
240. Id
241. See id.
242. RUSSELL-BROWN, supra note 226, at 100.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 105. Though I only discuss racial hoaxes in which Whites blame Blacks for the crime they
have committed, there are some examples of situations in which Blacks report having been victimized
by a crime and blame Whites. Id. at xcvii.
245. Id at 102.
246. Id at 107.
247. One notable case from 2008 involves Ashley Todd, a campaign worker for U.S. presidential
candidate John McCain, who claimed to have been approached by a Black man at a cash machine and
robbed of $60. Michael A. Fuoco, Jerome L. Sherman & Sadie Gurman, McCain Volunteer Admits to
Hoax: 'B' on Her Cheek, Black Eye Were Likely Self-Inflicted, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 25,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/neighborhoods/2008/10/25/McCain-volunteeradmits-to-hoax/stories/200810250133. Seeing the McCain sticker on her car, according to Todd, he
allegedly became enraged and assaulted her, punching her. Id. Todd insisted that the assailant carved the
letter "B" onto her cheek and said, "[y]ou are going to be a Barack supporter." Id. Police were
suspicious when they noticed that the B was backwards as it might be for an individual who is using a
mirror. Id. Todd confessed to inventing the story after police reviewed surveillance tapes. Id.
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son of long-time Philadelphia city councilman and controller Joseph
Vignola admitted he beat and cut the throat of a woman he met on
Craigslist, and falsely accused a Black man of the crime. 248 In 2010,
Bethany Storro of Vancouver, Washington, told police that she was
standing outside of a Starbucks when a Black girl in her twenties
approached her and said, "[h]ey, pretty girl, do you want to drink
this?" 2 4 9 According to Storro's account, the woman then threw acid
in Storro's face, causing serious disfigurement. 25 0 Police searched
extensively for the attacker until a newspaper reporter uncovered
witnesses who said that Storro was alone when she collapsed on the
street.2 51 Storro later admitted to fabricating the story and rubbing
drain cleaner on her face. 252
Imaginary Black assailants occur not just in the United States, but
also in Europe and even as far away as Australia. On November 2,
2007, someone sexually assaulted and stabbed British student
Meredith Kercher to death in the town of Perugia. 25 3 Her roommate,
Amanda Knox, told police that Congolese bar owner Patrick
Lumumba killed Kercher.2 54 Authorities arrested Knox, along with
248. Vernon Clark, Joseph Vignola Jr. Admits Attacking Woman He Met on Craigslist, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20100921_JosephVignola-Jr-ad
mitsattackingwoman he met on Craigslist.html. Vignola, Jr. met the woman on Craigslist, had
consensual sex with her, and then began to argue with her. Id. At some point, Vignola, Jr. punched the
woman in the throat and then knocked her unconscious. Id. After she was unconscious, he took a knife
and made a six-inch slash on the right side of her neck. Id. He then took back the money he paid the
woman and fled from the hotel. Id. Vignola, Jr. initially told police that a light-skinned Black man had
burst into the room while they were having sex and attacked the woman. Id He later confessed to the
crime. Id
249. 'I Am Totally Sorry': Acid Attack 'Victim' Who Gained World's Sympathy Sentenced After
Admitting It Was Hoax, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 10, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/artic
le- 1375208/Acid-attack-victim-Bethany-Storro-sentenced-admitting-hoax.html.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. Prosecutor: Clear Evidence of Crimes in Acid Attack Hoax, NBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2010, 1:18
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39278904/ns/us-news-crime-andcourts/t/prosecutor-clear-evidencecrimes-acid-attack-hoax/#.WaXX9sh96Uk.
253. Amanda Knox Trial Ordeal Is Over, but Meredith Kercher Murder Mystery Remains, WASH.
POST (Oct. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/amanda-knox-trial-ordeal-is-over-butmeredith-kercher-murder-mysteryremains/2011/10/05/gIQAFevEQL story.html?utmterm=.fa62dfc339ec.
254. Mark Townsend & Daniel Boffey, Amanda Knox Is Free Because She's Rich and American,
Says Patrick Lumumba, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2015, 10:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usAfter
news/2015/mar/28/amanda-knox-free-rich-american-patrick-lumumba-meredith-kercher-murder.
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Raffaele Sollecito, and a court later convicted them of killing
Kercher. 255
As an American, it is likely that Amanda Knox learned racial
politics and the appropriate scapegoats for crimes in the United
States. Americans are not the only ones who attribute their criminal
behavior to someone Black. For example, on April 10, 2016, Sophina
Nikat, a twenty-two-year-old living in Melbourne, Australia, claimed
that a shoeless Black man accosted her while she was pushing her
fourteen-month-old daughter, Sanaya Sahib, in a stroller.256
According to Nikat's story, the man, who smelled like alcohol,
pushed her, grabbed her child, and ran off. 25 7 Authorities found
Sanaya's dead body in a nearby creek.2 5 8 After security footage
showed the mother casually strolling away with an empty stroller,
police questioned Nikat, and she admitted to killing her toddler. 259
A.

White Racial Hoaxes as a Marker of the Symbolic Assailant

Though Blacks also commit racial hoaxes, White racial hoaxes
tend to fit different scenarios. In the past, well-publicized Black
hoaxes have involved a Black person (falsely) asserting that a racist
White person attacked them.26 0 Typically, racial hoaxes committed
Knox named Lumumba as the assailant, he was taken to the station at dawn and held in custody for two
weeks until a university professor provided Lumumba with an alibi. Priya Joshi, Amanda Knox Admits
She Struggles with Guilt for Accusing Patrick Lumumba of Meredith Kercher Murder, INT'L Bus.
TIMEs (Feb. 8, 2014, 8:26 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/amanda-knox-admits-she-struggles-guiltaccusing-patrick-lumumba-meredith-kercher-murder-1435683.
255. Amanda Knox "Full of Joy" After Conviction Overturned, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015, 5:50
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/conviction-overtumed-for-amanda-knox-again/.
Knox and
Sollecito served four years in prison before an appeals court acquitted them in 2011. Italy Court: Knox
and Kercher Fought Before Murder, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014, 7:30 AM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/italy-court-knox-and-kercher-fought-before-murder/.
256. Shannon Deery, Mum Sofina Nikat Charged Over Murder of Toddler Sanaya Sahib, HERALD
SUN (Apr. 13, 2016, 2:58 AM), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/woman-charged-overmurder-of-toddler-sanaya-sahib/news-story/lbO d8bcc8ad6bd9f449787adl4e4a3b.
257. Id.
2 5 8. Id.
259. Id.
260. The case of fifteen-year-old Tawana Brawley falls into this category. In 1987, Brawley accused
four White men, several of whom were police officers and one of whom was a prosecutor, of raping her.
Michael Gartland, Pay-Up Time for Brawley: '87 Rape-HoaxerFinally Shells Out for Slander, N.Y.
POST (Aug. 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/08/04/pay-up-time-for-brawley-87-rape-hoaxer-
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by Whites involve a White person committing a crime against
themselves or someone else, and selecting a stereotypical trope-the
Black man-on which to blame the crime. 26 1 The choice of a Black
perpetrator goes against the general pattern of criminal behavior.
Most violent crime involves victims and perpetrators of the same
racial background.2 62 In other words, White victims are most likely to
be attacked by other Whites.
Naming a Black person as the assailant, as racial hoaxers do, is for
most Whites an exercise in naming a racialized "other" with whom
they have little to no previous experience. Thus, the choice of the
fake Black perpetrator, that is, to name someone Black as the
assailant, is to reach outside of a White person's knowledge and
experience base. Most Whites have social networks that are almost
exclusively White. 263 In addition to social segregation, the high level
of residential segregation, as described in Part D, means that Whites
have no experience with Blacks as neighbors. 2 64 Thus, for many
Whites, their only real-life experience with a Black person in the
flesh may be at work.2 6 5
Despite the paucity of contact with flesh and blood Black people,
Whites around the nation have chosen to identify them as criminals.
Police investigation of the crimes often reveal the strangeness of this
behavior. One can imagine that the police questioning of Joseph
Vignola, who attacked the woman he met on a Craigslist and blamed
it on someone Black,2 6 6 went something like the following: Police
finally-shells-out-for-slander/. Brawley had been found in a garbage bag covered in feces with racial
slurs written on her body. Id A grand jury was convened to consider charges against the men Brawley
named as her attackers and concluded in October 1988 that she had not been assaulted as she claimed.
Jim Yardley, After a Decade, Brawley Reappears and Repeats Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/03/nyregion/after-a-decade-brawley-reappears-and-repeatscharges.html.
261. See RUSSELL-BROWN, supra note 226.
262. Sarah Becker, Race and Violent Offender "Propensity":Does the IntraracialNature of Violent
Crime Persiston the Local Level?, 9 JUST. RES. & POL'Y 53, 77 (2007).
263. See Daniel Cox et al., Race, Religion, and Political Affiliation of Americans' Core Social
Networks, PUB RELIGION RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://publicreligion.org/research/2014/08/analysissocial-network/#.VaelT-u7595.
264. See Becker, supra note 262 at 77.
265. See Cox, supranote 263.
266. Clark, supra note 247. See accompanying text in footnote.
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ask, "What happened?" The hoaxer responds, "A Black man burst
into the room where we were having sex, robbed us and slit her
throat." 267 Police further inquire, "What did he look like?" The
hoaxer responds, "Tallish? Light skinned." 268 Finally, police ask,
"What was he wearing?" The hoaxer (wearing jeans and a skull cap)
responds, "Jeans, and a skull cap." 269 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
authorities discover hoaxers' lies.
In racial hoaxes, the media, of course, plays a central role in
making the hoaxer believable. The media widely publicized the
Stuart case throughout the Boston area. 27 0 It is difficult to determine
how large a role the media plays, but it is certainly one that is critical
to the construction of the symbolic assailant. Sometimes, the role that
the media plays is relatively invisible. On other occasions, the media
contribution to the creation of a symbolic Black assailant is quite
apparent. In March 2015, the Iowa Gazette posted two stories about
local burglaries written by the same author and published within one
day of each other.27 1 One story used yearbook photos of the suspects
while the other used mug shots.2 7 2 The only other difference between
the two stories was that the writer depicted Whites using yearbook
photos and Blacks with mug shots as their pictures in the
newspaper.273
The discrepancy between how the media treated Black and White
criminals received significant commentary.2 7 In the paper's defense,
267. See, e.g., id.
268. See id
269. See id.
270. SHARKEY, supra note 228.
271. David Ferguson, Chargedwith Same Crime, Iowa PaperShows Black Suspects' Mug Shots but
Whites Get Yearbook Pics, RAW STORY (Mar. 31, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.rawstory.comI/2015/03/c
harged-with-same-crime-iowa-paper-shows-black-suspects-mug-shots-but-whites-get-yearbook-pics/.
272. Id.
273. Id. When reporting on Brock Turner, the Stanford swimmer who was arrested for raping an
unconscious woman in January 2015, media outlets used a yearbook photo rather than his booking
photo. Cf Elahe Izadi & Abby Ohlheiser, Why You Are Only Now Seeing the Stanford Sex Offender's
Mugshots, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2016/06/06/where-is-stanford-sex-offender-brock-tumers-mugshot-here/. One reason why
this may have occurred was because, unlike most cases, the Santa Clara County Sherriff's Office did not
post his arrest photo in a public format. Id
274. Ferguson, supra note 271.
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the Iowa Gazette editor Zack Kucharski blamed the discrepancy
between the two sets of pictures on "police procedure and newsroom
policies." 2 75 "Our policy is focused on getting the best images and
information to the public in a timely manner. Race is never a
factor." 2 7 6
B. Social Psychology and the Symbolic Assailant
Though media and the police may argue that race is never a factor,
social psychologists have long explored the extent to which
unconscious racial biases affect decision-making. In this regard,
research from social psychology provides support for the creation of
Black symbolic assailants. The association between Blacks and crime
may be an implicit association-below the level of consciousness.
Social psychologists have documented the stereotype of AfricanAmericans as violent and criminal.2 77
Using experiments, social psychologists have shown that
association of Blacks with criminality affects individuals' memory of
who is holding a deadly razor in a depiction of a subway scene. 2 78
Other research shows that Whites' negative evaluation of
ambiguously aggressive behavior is much more likely when the
research subject sees someone who is African-American. 279 When
Whites see nonweapons in the hands of African-Americans, they are
more likely to categorize such items as weapons. 28 0 Finally, in studies
involving White community participants and trained officers, the
275. Adam Carros & Zack Kucharski, Gazette, KCRG-TV9 Photos Explained, GAZETTE (Apr. 3,
9
2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/opinion/guest-columnists/gazette-kcrg-tv -photosexplained-20150403.
276. Id
277. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5-16 (1989); Birt L. Duncan, DifferentialSocial
Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping Blacks, 34
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 590, 590-97 (1976); Goff et al., supra note 196, at 530; RUSSELLBROWN, supra note 226, at 98.
278. L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the FourthAmendment, 44 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 267, 288 (2012).
279. Devine, supra note 277, at 7; Duncan, supra note 277, at 591.
280. B. Keith Payne, Prejudiceand Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processesin
Misperceivinga Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 181, 181 (2001).
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speed at which White participants and officers decide to shoot an
individual holding a weapon is shorter if the individual is AfricanAmerican than if the individual is White. 28 1
Police officers, particularly patrol officers, are often forced to
make hasty decisions within the course of their jobs. Concerning the
use of deadly force, Tennessee v. Garner allows police to use deadly
force to prevent the escape of a suspect only if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or another. 28 2 As we
have seen from the killings of more than 100 unarmed Blacks
between 2015 and 2016, errors in calculation-the deadly shooting or
killing of an individual who poses no credible threat to the officerfrequently occurred when the potential assailant was AfricanAmerican. 283
There is conflicting data on whether police officers are more likely
to shoot an unarmed Black person or an unarmed White person.
Census data puts the number of African-Americans at approximately
13%284 and the number of Whites at approximately 72% of the
United States' population. 2 85 Concerning the number of shootings of
unarmed individuals, a Washington Post analysis of unarmed
shootings occurring in cities around the United States in 2015
revealed that though police shot a greater number of Whites, AfricanAmericans were five times more likely to be shot than Whites. 28 6 The
281. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: UsingEthnicity to DisambiguatePotentially
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 1314, 1314 (2002); Joshua Correll et
al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8
Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS, 201, 206 (2014).

282. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
283.
2015 Unarmed Victims, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/unarmed/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2017). Examples of situations where the individual killed arguably posed no credible
threat to the officer include Walter Scott, Jonathan Ferrell, and Eric Garner. See, e.g., Baker, Goodman
& Mueller, supra note 110; Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 132; Kindy & Kelly, supra note 195.
284. SONYA RASTOGI, TALLESE D. JOHNSON, ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL & MALCOLM P. DREWERY,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010 (Sept. 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2
0l0/briefs/c20l0br-06.pdf.
285. LINDSAY HIxSON, BRADFORD B. HEPLER & MYOUNG OUK KIM, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
WHITE POPULATION: 2010 (Sept. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c20lObr-05.pdf
286. Wesley Lowery, Aren't More White People Than Black People Killed by the Police? Yes but No,
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Center for Policing Equity (CPE) analyzed records documenting the
use of force by police in twelve police departments located in
geographically and demographically diverse areas of the United
States.2 8 7 Similar to the Washington Post's analysis, the study found
African-Americans were more likely to have force used against them
than Whites.2 8 8 The racial disparity the CPE researchers found in the
use of force was present in each of the several categories of use of
force-firearm, pepper spray, and Taser-studied.2 8 9
When one moves beyond the use of force data to other measures of
police-citizen interaction, the picture that emerges is incontrovertible:
police officers treat African-Americans differently than they treat
Whites. 2 9 0 The idea of a symbolic assailant at the foremost of police
officers' consciousness means that African-Americans are more
likely to face police violence because of their race. Similar to Charles
Epp and his co-authors, Fryer found through his work that AfricanAmericans were likely to face more brutality in the context of police
encounters. 2 9 1 We do not know whether this translates to an increased
likelihood of being shot unless we can observe the encounter between
the law enforcement officer and citizen before the shooting.
Scholars attribute many of the police shootings of AfricanAmericans to implicit biases. 2 9 2 Social psychologists posit that
implicit biases-judgments resulting from subtle cognitive
processes-affect individuals in many ways. Not only do implicit
biases affect the way a person interprets behavior, but they also affect
2

WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/ 016/07/11/arentmore-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no/?utmterm=.c4f3d3170c58; cf
Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
Police Use of Force 5, tbl. 10 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Georgia State University
Law Review) (finding no evidence of racial discrimination in officer-involved shootings using police
data from three cities in Texas, six large Florida counties, and Los Angeles County).
287.

PHILIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICE EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS

AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (July 2016), http://policingequity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/CPESoJ_Race-Arrests-UoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id
290. Id at 13, 14, 16-19, 22, 24.
291. See Fryer, supranote 286, at 3-4.
292. See Richardson, supra note 278, at 271-72.
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how a person responds to a particular behavior.2 9 3 L. Song
Richardson examined a study of people's reactions to certain
behavior: participants saw videos of people shoving each other;2 94
one video was of two White people, one of two Black people, and the
other of two people from different races.2 95 Participants saw the
behavior as more violent and aggressive when the video was of two
Black people and when the aggressor was Black.2 9 6 However, they
saw the video as playful when there were two White people and
where the aggressor was White.2 9 7 Next, Richardson examined a
study revealing that aggression is manifested more towards
minorities than towards Whites. 29 8 In that study, a group of people
were asked to complete a task in which either a photo of a Black or
White person would flash in front of them. 299 Researchers flashed the
photos 130 times. 300 When it was time for the last photo, the
computer ceased operating, and the participants would have to start
the process over from the beginning. 30 1 When participants saw Black
faces instead of White faces they were angrier and more
aggressive.3 0 2 Richardson concluded that:
These implicit biases have relevance to police-citizen
interactions .

.

.. [O]fficers engaged in proactive policing

are making judgments of criminality based upon their
interpretation of a target's ambiguous behaviors. Implicit
biases can disadvantage nonwhites because officers are
more likely to interpret their ambiguous behaviors as
suspicious. Then, when the officer approaches the
individual to confirm his suspicions, he may
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 272-73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Richardson, supra note 278, at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273-74.
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unintentionally and non-consciously act aggressively.
When the target responds in-kind, the officer will likely
interpret the targets seemingly unprovoked aggressive
response as evidence that the target is dangerous. This will
make the officer more likely to conduct a frisk for
weapons. This series of events can explain why officers
often make incorrect judgments of criminality when the
target is nonwhite as opposed to white. 303
Officers may face several repercussions and biases because of
these implicit biases. Cops stop and frisk a significantly higher
number of Blacks than Whites.3 04 Officers exhibit two particularly
interesting biases: shooter bias and attentional bias. 305 Shooter bias
refers to studies that show cops are more likely to shoot an unarmed
Black person, especially a Black man, than shoot an armed White
person. 306 Attentional bias is a subconscious drawing of attention to
Black people and the increase in attention that Black people are
shown over White people. 307 These biases are attributed to the idea
that Black people are more threatening, more dangerous, and more
feared than White people. 30 8
Police officers may interpret behavior and handle situations
involving Black people differently than those with White people
because of these biases. 309 For example, Terry v. Ohio is supposed to
be a safeguard to keep police officers from being able to stop and
frisk unless they have a reasonable suspicion that the person has,
will, or is going to commit a crime, or they have a reasonable belief
the person is armed and dangerous. 3 10 However, Terry does not
303. Id. at 274.
304. Richardson, supra note 145, at 1145.
305. Id. at 1149-50.
306. Id. at 1149.
307. Id. at 1150.
308. Id. at 1150-51.
309. Id.
310. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). In this landmark case, establishing the standard that an
officer needed reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk an individual, the officer saw men walking in front
of a store and thought they might be trying to rob the place. Id. at 5-7, 27. The officer stopped and
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account for such implicit biases that may cause an officer to interpret
the behavior of a non-White person as suspicious. 3 1 1
C. Dehumanization and the Symbolic Assailant: Social
PsychologicalSupportfor Symbolic Assailant
Social psychologists suggest that dehumanization serves as one
potential explanation for why police officers treat African-Americans
so poorly. 3 12 Dehumanization-"the denial of full humanness"allows officers to remove or reduce social or legal protections for
those who are dehumanized.3 1 3 Police officers may see dehumanized
subjects, considered not fully human, as less capable of feeling pain
and may subject them to greater use of force. 3 14 Historically, the
process of dehumanization has been a requirement for extreme forms
of state violence like genocide. 3 15
Social psychologist Philip Atiba Goff studied the effect of implicit
dehumanization of African-Americans on police. 3 16 One set of
studies by Goff and his colleagues evaluated how dehumanization of
African-American children might affect the use of force. 3 17 In the
first study using police as subjects, Goff and his colleagues gave
sixty police officers in a large city computer tests measuring their
level of dehumanizing attitudes. 3 18 Goff and his colleagues also gave
respondents the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a test which
measures the degree to which individuals hold implicit biases. 3 19
Next, Goff and his colleagues gave the respondents a series of crime
frisked the men and found a gun on one of them. Id at 7. Richardson suggests that had the men been
White, the officer might not have interpreted their behavior as suspicious. See Richardson, supra note
145, at 1152.
311. Richardson, supra note 145, at 1152.
312. Philip Atiba Goff et al., supra note 196, at 527.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 532-33.
317. See id. at 527.
318. Philip Atiba Goff et al., supra note 196, at 533, 537. For instance, to measure dehumanization,
researchers exposed officers to photographs of apes to assess the extent to which officers associated
apes with African-Americans. See id. at 527-28.
319. 1d. at 530-31.
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scenarios involving men who were either Black, White, or Latino. 320
Finally, Goff and his colleagues asked respondents to give the age of
the individuals involved and whether each had actually committed
the crime described.3 2 1
With the assistance of the police department's Internal Affairs
Bureau, the researchers linked the test results with each officer's use
of force history contained in their personnel files.322 The use of force
records in the officers' personnel files documented whenever an
officer made any physical contact with a civilian. 323 The researchers
ranked the use of force records in order of the level of severity.32 4
The use of force incidents ranged from the deployment of a wristlock
takedown to the use of deadly force (firearm or carotid choke
hold).3 2 5
Goff and his colleagues found significant evidence of implicit
racial bias. The researchers found that police officers overestimated
the ages of Black and Latino crime suspects. 326 Analyzing the use of
force and the officer's dehumanization of those pictured in the study,
researchers found that the implicit dehumanization of Blacks, which
involves associating Blacks with nonhuman animals, "was a
significant predictor of racial disparities in the use of force against
child suspects..

.

. [T]he more officers implicitly associated Blacks

with apes, the more officers had used force against Black children
relative to children of other races." 327
Implicit associations between Blacks and criminality may also
explain significant divides with respect to race in public opinion data
post-Ferguson. The Pew Research Center conducted a survey in early
320. Id. at 531.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 533.
323. Philip Atiba Goff et al., supra note 196, at 533.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id at 535.
327. Id Goff et al. describe the history of dehumanization and how "individuals tend to associate outgroups and out-group members with nonhuman animals more than they do members of their in-group."
Id at 527. Their research, which resulted in White participants implicitly associating Black people with
apes, is an example of this type of dehumanization. Id.
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December of 2014.328 Their results revealed, for instance, that 64%
of Whites believed that the grand jury's decision not to charge
Darren Wilson in the death of Ferguson teenager, Michael Brown,
was the right decision.3 29 By contrast, 80% of Blacks surveyed felt
that the grand jury's refusal to charge Wilson was the wrong
decision.3 30 Whites' attitudes were also reflected in their evaluation
of the legal process. In the survey 84% of Whites believed that race
was not a factor in the grand jury's decision not to charge Wilson. 33 1
Blacks felt quite differently; 64% of Blacks believed that race was a
major factor in the grand jury's decision not to charge Wilson. 332
D.

Eradicatingthe Symbolic Assailant

If there is a belief that the boogeyman is Black, our current level of
interracial social contact does little to dispel such false notions.
Rising tolerance and changing attitudes toward racial intermarriage
has not affected our level of social intermixing. 33 3 In fact, in most
contexts, there are massive levels of social separation and physical
distance between Blacks and Whites. 3 34 For many middle and
upper-class Americans, the majority of the time we spend relaxing is
spent in the neighborhoods in which we live-which are segregated
spaces. 335 Analysis of the 2010 Census reveals that the typical White
person lives in a neighborhood that is 75% White. 336
Though the survey data on tolerance for housing integration shows
that most Americans support removing legal restrictions to housing

328. Sharp RacialDivisions in Reactions to Brown, GarnerDecisions, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp)-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-brown-garner-decisions/.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR:
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 95 (2013).

MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF

334. Id.
335. Id. at 97.
336.
THE

JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT, THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN
METROPOLIS:
NEW
FINDINGS
FROM
THE
2010
CENSUS
3
(2011),

https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf.
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integration,33 7 both the data on housing choice and move-in
violence-acts of harassment and hate crimes directed at people of
color who have moved into White neighborhoods-suggest broad
support among Whites, Asian-Americans, and Latinos for the
(segregated) status quo. The Multicity Study of Urban Inequality in
Los Angeles asked Whites, African-Americans, Asians, and Latinos
who they would feel comfortable living around, regardless of class of
the neighborhood. 338 The results revealed that African-Americans are
the least preferred neighbor among the races. 339
Many middle-class African-Americans understand this hostility
that Whites feel toward them as neighbors. 34 0 Some of those who
ignore White hostility and end up crossing the color line face movein violence-acts of harassment and hate crimes directed at
minorities who have moved to White neighborhoods. 34 1 This
violence, which I have termed "anti-integrationist violence," can take
the form of vandalism, cross burning, assault, and arson. 342 It is not
limited to any particular area of the country. Between 1990 and 2010,
I identified more than 400 reported incidents directed at minorities
who had moved to all-White or predominately White neighborhoods
in the North, South, Midwest, and Western United States. 343 (See
Figure 1.)
Though most workplaces may be more diverse than most
neighborhoods,3 44 it may be a mistake to see workplaces as a good
locale for cross-cultural interaction. Who we interact with within the
workplace matters. A survey by the Public Religion Research
Institute (PRRI) suggests many Whites primarily socialize with other

337. BELL, supra note 333, at 97.
338. Id. at 100.
339. Id. at 102.
340. See id at 113.
341. Id at 89.
342. Id.
343. BELL, supranote 333, at 67.
344. See id. at 100; see also Crosby Bums et al., The State of Diversity in Today's Workforce, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (July 2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2012/07/pdf/diversity brief pdf.
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Whites.3 45 In the 2013 Public Religion and Values Survey, PRR1
tried to get a sense of the race of the individuals who comprised
respondents' social networks. 346 Respondents were asked the name of
two to seven people with whom they had talked about "important
matters" in the preceding six months. 34 7 They were then asked to
describe the race, gender, and other demographic identifiers for these
individuals. 34 8
Figure 1. Incidents of Anti Integrationist Violence 1990-2010349

Incidents of MoveIn Violence: 1990-2010

In the survey, PRRI found that most Whites' social networks are
overwhelmingly White. 3 50 With respect to surveyed Whites, 91% of
the individuals who make up their social networks are also White. 35 1
Just 5% of the individuals with whom Whites discussed important
345.
3 46.
347.
348.
349.
350.
3 51.

See Cox et al., supra note 263.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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matters in the previous six months were people of different races.352
The differences were not as stark for people of other racial
backgrounds. Latinos have the most diverse social networks with
64% of the people in their social networks also being Latino. 353 In
Latino social networks 19% of the individuals were White and 9%
were some other race. 3 54 For African-Americans, 83% of individuals
who comprise their social networks are also Black, 8% are White,
and 6% are of another racial background.3 5 5
In a country where negative stereotypes of Blackness are so
powerfully linked with criminality, racial separation is not neutral.
As White homogenous environments become equated with safety,
mixed neighborhoods appear dangerous and unsafe. It is clear who is
causing the danger. African-Americans, regardless of class, become
symbolic assailants, suspects even when headed to their own
neighborhoods. They are automatically "out of place" and suspicious
when they appear unexpectedly in White neighborhoods. Police
practices, which give credence to the symbolic Black assailant by
stopping African-Americans more in White neighborhoods, 356 only
confirm what neighborhood residents already believe-these Black
people coming into their neighborhood are always potential
outsiders.
IV Reform
Despite the role that the Black symbolic assailant may play in
Americans' subconscious, there have been attempts to address the
symbolic assailant. Some of these attempts have been citizen-led
efforts in the form of protests and others have been federal, state, and
local government responses. Below, I detail some of the most
significant government responses aimed at police reform.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
using

Cox et al., supra note 263.
Id.
Id
Id.
See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 70-72 (describing officers
suspicionless investigatory stops of African-Americans in suburban White neighborhoods).
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Criminal or Civil ChargesAgainst Officers

Officers who treat African-Americans differently than Whites
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.3 5 7 More robust potential
remedies may be civil rights charges for Fourth Amendment
violations or, in the alternative, criminal charges against the officers.
The logic here is that the threat of charges will serve as a deterrent
against bad behavior. Unfortunately, because of the structure of these
remedies, neither is likely to lead to significant changes. Based on
current policing practices, police have discretion to decide when
someone is a threat. 58 After an officer kills a person, if the
prosecutor decides to conduct an examination of police behavior, the
prosecutor, and sometimes grand juries, examine the officer's
actions. 3 5 9
Activists frequently push for criminally charging officers. 3 6 0 In
addition to bringing justice in particular cases, many people believe
that criminal charges against the officers involved will create a
disincentive for other officers to engage in brutality. 3 6 1 A variety of
problems exist with this particular approach. First, the remedy of
criminally charging officers would only be used in the most extreme
cases because prosecutors rarely bring criminal charges against
police officers who have killed Black civilians.3 62 Only a small
percentage of police shootings or killings of unarmed suspects result
in criminal charges against the police officers. 3 6 3 The Washington
Post and other researchers conducted a study which found only fiftyfour officers were criminally charged between 2005 and 2015,
despite thousands of police-instigated shootings.3 64 Prosecutors
tended to bring charges only in the most extreme cases, those
involving individuals who were not just unarmed, but who were also
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See generally Rosenthal, supra note 37, at 55.
Id.
See generally BELL, supra note 25, at 79.
Id.
Id
See Kindy & Kelly, supra note 195.
Id.
Id.
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shot in the back, and where testimony from other officers supported
the charges. 365 Video of the incident also made charges more
likely.3 66 Even when charges were brought, officers were unlikely to
be sanctioned; the majority of cases did not result in the officers
being convicted.3 67
When officers are charged, the idea of Black criminality looms
large and is frequently too much for jurors, or even a judge, to
dismiss. Even in cases that may seem straightforward enough to
result in prosecutors bringing charges, these cases do not result in
convictions. Three high-profile cases in 2016 occurred in Baltimore,
Charleston, and Cincinnati, where officers shot and killed unarmed
Black men and faced charges, but they were not convicted.
Prosecutors charged six officers after the death of Freddie Gray,
which the medical examiner ruled a homicide; Judge Barry Williams
acquitted three officers. 368 The trial of Ray Tensing, the officer who
shot and killed Samuel DuBose in Cincinnati, ended in a mistrial
because the jury of two Blacks and ten Whites could not agree on a
conviction. 36 9 In the case of Michael Slager, the Charleston police
officer who shot Walter Scott, a jury of one Black and eleven White
jurors also resulted in a mistrial.3 70
365. Id.
366. BELL, supranote 25.
367. Id.
368. Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero Convictions Against
Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie(describing prosecutor Marilyn Mosby
gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.html
dropping charges against Officer Garrett Miller, Officer William Porter, and Sergeant Alicia White after
Judge Barry G. Williams acquitted three other officers charged in Gray's death).
369. Kevin Grasha, Sharon Coolidge, Chris Graves & Mark Cumutte, After Tensing Mistrial, What
Will Deters Do Next?, CINCINNATI.COM (Nov. 12, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/ne
ws/tensing/2016/11/12/tensing-jury-continue-deliberations-saturday/93671484/ (describing the mistrial
of Officer Ray Tensing, who shot Samuel DuBose); Andy Newman, Jury Deadlocks in Trial of ExOfficer in Killing of Unarmed Black Driver in Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/1 1/13/us/ray-tensing-samuel-dubose-trialdeadlock.html?mcubz-0&mcubz=0.
370. Alan Blinder, Mistrialfor South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-scott-michael-slager-north-charleston.html?_r)
(detailing the events leading to the mistrial of former officer Michael Slager, who shot Walter Scott);
Alan Blinder, CharlestonJury Gets Case of Officer Who Killed Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/us/michael-slager-walter-scott-killing.html?mcubz-0.
Slager eventually pled guilty to a federal charge of violating Scott's civil rights in May 2017. Jaweed
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A fourth case involving Terrence Crutcher, mentioned earlier in
this Article, illustrates the power of the Black symbolic assailant
among both police and ordinary citizens. 371 Crutcher was unarmed,
and Officer Betty Shelby shot him while he was walking away. 372
Shelby testified that she shot Crutcher because she reasonably feared
for her life.3 73 A jury of eight women and four men, including four
African-Americans, accepted this defense and acquitted Shelby. 374
The failure to convict officers accused of shooting unarmed Black
civilians, even in high-profile cases like these mentioned, suggest
that criminal charges against officers may not provide the deterrence
that advocates of these solutions believe they provide.
B. Increasingthe Legitimacy of the Police
Arguably, President Obama issued the most comprehensive
nationwide policy response when he created the Task Force on 21st
Century Policing (Task Force). The Task Force convened in
December 2014 and heard months of testimony from academics,
community members, and legal experts.3 7 5 In May 2015, the Task
Force issued its final report: a comprehensive ninety-nine-page report
with fifty-one recommendations and more than seventy action items
for improving police legitimacy. 376 The recommendations ranged
from fairly soft mechanisms designed to increase police legitimacy 3 7 7
Kaleem, Michael Slager, Officer Who Fatally Shot Walter Scott in South Carolina, Pleads Guilty in
Federal Case, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-michaelslager-walter-scott-2017-story.html.
371. Lucia Walinchus & Richard Pdrez-Pefla, White Tulsa Officer Is Acquitted in Fatal Shooting of
Black Driver, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/white-tulsa-officeris-acquitted-in-fatal-shooting-of-black-driver.html.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375.

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21sT CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S

TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForceFi
nalReport.pdf.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., id at 11. Recommendation 1.1, for instance, called on law enforcement culture to
"embrace a guardian mindset to build public trust and legitimacy. Toward that end, police and sheriffs'
departments should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies
and practices to guide their interactions with the citizens they serve." Id.
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to fairly substantial changes that would drastically affect police
procedures around the country. 378
Several recommendations specifically aim at fostering better
relationships between police officers and communities. Many of
these recommendations consciously reflect the logic of community
policing efforts. Community policing encourages law enforcement
officers to work with neighborhood residents as community partners
in the effort to treat people with more respect. 379 This particular
strategy might decrease the number of fatalities-an undeniably
positive development.
Treating the African-American population with more respect and
developing community police partnerships are soft measures for
changing the way police operate. Such measures may improve some
encounters between police and citizens, but these measures will not
magically improve police relations, particularly if racialized policing
continues. The problem with calls for increased politeness, respect,
and community partnership to improve police legitimacy is that these
measures do not respond to the issue of racialized police practices. 3 80
Clear evidence shows the occurrence of racialized policing. 38 1
A variety of factors suggest that community-police partnerships
and other "soft" measures are not likely to increase trust between
African-Americans and the police. First, and most important, is the
sheer number of unarmed African-American men killed by police in
cities around the country and the reciprocal activism. More citizens
can watch graphic deaths of those killed by police. Videos of
numerous police killings of African-Americans have been heavily

378. See, e.g., id. at 27. Recommendation 2.10 states: "[f]aw enforcement officers should be required
to seek consent before a search and explain that a person has the right to refuse consent when there is no
warrant or probable cause. Furthermore, officers should ideally obtain written acknowledgment that they
have sought consent to search in these circumstances." Id.
379. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supranote 375, at 3.
380. See Tom Tyler, Trust and Legitimacy: Policing in the USA and Europe, 8 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY
254, 261 (2011) (describing gains in trust that can be realized by employing policing procedures that the
public view as procedurally fair); Tom Tyler & Jeffery Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO J. CRIM. L. 231, 264-65 (2008).
381. See discussion supraPart II.
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and graphically captured and distributed on social media.3 8 2 AfricanAmericans fear the police because many individuals have been killed
during routine traffic stops.3 83 Politeness and police-community
partnerships are unlikely to cut through the current level of
(understandable) fear that African-Americans have of the police. A
final indication that soft measures have little effect on trust is
research exploring the relationship between officer politeness and
Black drivers' dislike of racialized policing. Epp found that most
African-American drivers took offense at investigatory stops, even
though officers who performed them were polite. 3 84
Though the reforms in the 21st Century Report might help
eliminate some of the difficulties African-Americans face with
respect to the police, given the poor relationship between
African-Americans and police, reforms have a limited ability to
disrupt this deep level of mistrust. The report's recommendations
also do little to disrupt the empirical fallacies that lead police officers
to see every African-American as a symbolic assailant.3 8 5
C. ReorientingPolice Work to Disruptthe Symbolic Assailant
1. End the Investigatory Stop
Eradicating the myth of the symbolic assailant begins with
changing long-standing practices that affect the relationship between
African-Americans and the police. The most significant factor
affecting this relationship is the space in which the majority of
African-Americans encounter the police.
For most African-Americans, like Americans of other
backgrounds, the most likely place in which they will encounter the

382. Lucy Bayly, Police Shootings Test New Era of Violent Social Media Video, NBC NEws (July 9,
2016, 9:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/police-shootings-test-new-era-violentsocial-media-video-n605366.
383. See, e.g., Collman, supra note 203 (describing the killing of Philando Castile during a "routine
traffic stop" for a broken tail-light).
384. See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 2.

385. See discussion supra Part III.
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police is during a stop made while driving. 386 As discussed in Part II,
these are investigatory stops, and police officers' power to conduct
them stems from the Fourth Amendment.3 87 Although the spaces
where different races encounter the police are similar, the research by
Charles Epp and others described in Part II suggests that the
experiences of Whites and African-Americans (to take two different
racial groups) are dramatically different.3 8 8 Many African-Americans
are stopped for reasons that have nothing to do with the manner in
which they are driving.3 89 Such discriminatory stops affect how
African-Americans feel about the police in general and their behavior
in situations where the officer has made a legitimate stop.
To improve the relationship between African-Americans and the
police, Epp and his co-authors suggest that police departments must
discontinue the practice of stopping individuals because they are
suspicious.3 9 0 Because such stops are allowed under the Constitution,
this policy change would require departments to behave in a manner
that is both more restrictive of the police and more protective of
suspects' rights than the United States Constitution.
It is not outrageous to assume that police departments would elect
to behave in a manner more protective of individual rights than the
Constitution requires. Clear incentives encourage police to enact
reforms that take away officers' ability to stop individuals solely for
386. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The DisproportionateRisks of Driving While Black,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stopsdriving-black.html?mcubz--1.
387. See discussion supra Part II. The decisions in this context constitute a clear expansion of police
rights. Terry v. Ohio allows officers to make stops so long as there is reasonable suspicion the individual
is engaged in criminal activity. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff potentially
expands this power by lowering the burden even further. In Strieff the Court upheld evidence seized
after a warrantless stop of an individual made by a police officer without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, reasoned that the
evidence seized was attenuated from the illegal activity, so the exclusionary rule should not apply. Id. at
2063.
388. See generally EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150.
389. Id at 72.
390. Id. at 153, 164 ("[The] message is simple: the benefits of investigatory stops are modest and
greatly exaggerated, yet their costs are substantial and largely unrecognized. It is time to end this failed
practice. Investigatory stops fail because they violate a widely shared norm of fair treatment. This norm
requires that people should be treated as equal, respected members of society and not as second-class
outsiders . . . .").
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reasons of "suspicion." 39 1 First, as Epp's work shows, AfricanAmericans know that they have been stopped without just cause, and
this fact is upsetting. 392 Stops of African-Americans--due to purely
race-based suspicion and not lawbreaking-poison the relationship
between the police and the community.3 9 3 In addition, communities
with poor police relations are much harder to police. Poor
community-police relations make crime investigation more
challenging. 394 Investigative stops are based on officers' hunchestheir guesses that a particular individual is involved in
lawbreaking. 395 These unquantifiable guesses rarely pay off in the
form of evidence. 396 If stops require manpower but do not reliably
yield evidence, as a crime fighting tool, they are a poor use of scarce
police department resources. Finally and most importantly,
unwarranted investigative stops can potentially have a terrible human
cost. Poor police and community relations may even endanger
officers' safety.39 7 Some have argued that recent attacks on police
officers by mentally ill individuals stem from poor relationships
between police officers and African-Americans. 398
Resistance to changes of the sort I have suggested is by no means
inevitable. Consider the case of Fayetteville, North Carolina. In 2013,
a Fayetteville police report revealed police stopped Blacks more than
Whites. 399 The resulting controversy led to the departure of the police
391. The issue is not the level of suspicion that the law requires under Terry v. Ohio, but rather, as
Epp and others have noted, the failure of officers to conform to the law's dictates. If officers are
conducting investigatory stops because they believe Blacks are more likely to be engaged in criminal
behavior, these are race-based stops.
392. See Epp, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 150, at 119-20 (describing the
offense that drivers take from being targeted because of their race).
393. See Collins, supra note 97, at 419 (illustrating that bad relationships form between officers and
communities when officers stop citizens with "only vague suspicions of misconduct").
394. Id. at 426.
395. Terry, 392 U.S. at 49-50.
396. See id. at 22. Courts' consistent refusal to endorse searches based solely on officers' hunches
suggests that traffic stops based on such hunches are also disallowed by courts. Id.
397. See Tyler, supra note 380, at 261.
398. See Feuer, supra note 211 (describing a case where a mentally ill African-American woman was
shot and killed by police, causing widespread outrage in the city's African-American community and
leading to other similar incidents).
399. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 386.
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chief and city manager. 400 The new police chief in Fayetteville, North
Carolina, Chief Harold Medlock, elected to have officers eliminate
the use of the investigatory stop and instead focus on violations that
"cost lives," like speeding and drunk driving. 40 1 The department
forced out officers who had a reputation of disproportionately
stopping Black drivers. 402 Such changes drastically affected the rates
of differential policing and improved the relationship with the
African-American community.403
2. Creatingthe Spacefor "Conversion"
Changes such as ending the investigatory stop are a preliminary
first step in eradicating the African-American symbolic assailant. A
more significant step involves changing how police officers see
African-Americans. Because of stereotypes, police practices, and
implicit bias, many police officers view African-Americans
predominantly as suspects. 404 To change how so many police officers
see African-Americans, police training must change in a way that
allows officers to see African-Americans as crime victims, not
suspects. I describe this process of conversion below.
I approach the idea of reform from the perspective of a police
researcher who has seen officers' productive interactions with people
of color. In 1997, I spent six months observing a specialized police
hate crime unit in a largely White city. Afforded open access to the
unit, I spent ten hours a day with the detectives. I went on
investigations with them, had full access to their files, and went to
court with them.40 5

400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Denise Cummins, Are Police Shootings Racially Biased?, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 13, 2016, 5:08
PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/police-shootings-racially-biased/.
405. I did not get to hold a gun like Jerry Skolnick did-in fact, in the only situation that involved
danger, they made me stay in the car-but with that one exception, I did everything that the cops did
during the time that I was with them.
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I have seen White officers transformed by the practice of providing
services to victims of color. A process I describe as "conversion" in
my book Policing Hatred'0 6 transformed ordinary police officers,
many of whom were White, into committed advocates for victims of
color. 4 0 7 Officers became victim advocates as they did their work as
detectives investigating and responding to crime.
Part of the conversion occurred because of the setting. The
detectives often met with victims in their homes and took notes to
write a detailed report. Reports filled many of the case files. Seeing
individuals of color in a vulnerable space led to the conversion. You
could see this in the perspective of officers who had done the work
and also officers who had not done the work. One White officer who
is clearly "converted," said:
Victims are powerless .... The victim has no one on his
side. I want to say I'm going to take this injunction and
wrap this piece of paper around you. My protection will be
with you. I bring my police power to the table to protect
victims.4

08

In several comments, the detectives made clear that interacting
with families and seeing them experience pain led to their
conversion. The political ideology of the officer was not relevant.
One detective noted, "no working cops get involved and don't get
converted. No cops leave the unit saying they couldn't do that racial
BS; more like they couldn't do police work." 40 9
The attitudes the officers displayed towards minorities in the unit
were fairly unusual based on what researchers have described in
other contexts. Conversion transformed officers. Officers become
fiercely attached to victims for two primary reasons. First, the
406. JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE CRIME
127-29 (2002).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 127.
409. Id. at 129.
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process of becoming converted allowed police officers to learn on the
job. They were investigating cases with real bad guys in a manner
they believed was really part of police work. This work was very
important to their identity as cops.410 Second, the unit's work
provided officers an opportunity to see people of color in a very
vulnerable space. Crime victims have extraordinary experiences. This
practice not only humanized people of color for officers, but it also
allowed officers to assist with finding the individuals who committed
the crime against them. Providing this assistance is something that
deeply resonated with the officers because it connected them to the
force and something that they considered an essential part of the job.
Most of the detectives in the hate crime unit I studied had
dramatically different relationships with the people they served, in
part because of police-citizen interaction organization. This
organization was reactive policing.4 11 The vast majority of the
minority police interaction involved police officers investigating
crimes that victimized minorities in traumatic ways.
One of the problems with proactive policing is that right now most
police see Blacks only in the context of lawbreakers who take from
their communities.4 12 The Broken Windows proactive policing
approach has meant that officers' interaction with communities
focuses on preventing crime by seeing African-Americans as
suspects-not by responding to citizen complaints.4 1 3 If we want to
change the relationship that police officers have with minorities, we
need to fundamentally change the roles that police officers have in
minority communities. This change will have to be a big shift
because it is far more complicated than the current policing of Black
neighborhoods suggests, in which police officers often do little
410. BELL, supra note 406. The police department had a community-policing program. Id. The
community-policing officer was an individual that they described as doing "social work." Id. Higher-ups
in the unit insisted that a crime should never be given to the community-policing officer because it just
would not be taken seriously. Id.
411. Id. at 120-23. Reactive policing, described earlier in this article, occurs when police observe a
crime and respond to it in the moment. See, e.g., Epp, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra

note 150, at 65 (describing traffic stops that occur in a discriminatory manner).
412. See Tyler, supra note 380, at 256-57.
413. Id.
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investigation of serious crimes involving Black victims, including
murder. 4 14 If police departments change the policing of minority
communities to a much more reactive model, then police could focus
on providing services to citizens. This change is an unusual approach,
but in my experience, it is the only one that may change how officers
actually see African-Americans.
This Article has argued that police frequently approach Black men
as symbolic assailants. As intersectionality theory suggests, the case
of Black women is more complicated.4 15 Though officers may not
perceive Black women to be as threatening as Black men, in several
instances they have been harmed and have even been killed by
police.4 16 If we really want to change the culture of fear and disrupt
the policing practices that treat Blackness as a marker of suspicion or
lack of respect, police departments must shift their focus from one
that relies on proactive policing to socialize officers to one that
requires each officer to interact with Black victims. Placing officers
in situations where their primary functions are to provide services
and respond to African-Americans as victims will teach the officers
that African-Americans are citizens in need of services from the
police.
Though the unit I studied is a hate crime unit, reorienting policing
need not focus on hate crime. There is no shortage of AfricanAmerican victims. Criminals victimize African-Americans at
incredibly high rates. 4 17 Officers must interact with AfricanAmericans in the vulnerable space of being victimized.
CONCLUSION

Tamir Rice, Terrence Crutcher, Alton Sterling, and Philando
Castile are contemporary society's canaries in the coal mine. From
414. Jennifer Gonnerman, JillLeovy's 'Ghettoside,'N.Y. TImS (Jan. 21, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/books/review/jill-leovys-ghettoside.html.
415. Amuchie, supra note 207, at 619-20.
416. Id. at 617-18.
417. Kelling & Bratton, supra note 118.
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the early 1900s until the mid-1980s, coal miners would carry canary
cages down into the mine tunnels. 4 18 If methane or carbon monoxide
leaked into the mine, the gases would kill the canary before killing
the miners, thus providing a warning to exit the tunnels
immediately.4 19
The deaths of Rice, Sterling, Castile, and too many others provide
clear evidence to all of American society that Blacks and Whites live
in radically different worlds.4 20 These killings say much about the
progress we have made with respect to opportunity and civil rights in
this country. What we say, what we feel, and how we address these
shootings says something about how much progress American
society has made with respect to racial tolerance. From a sheer
policing perspective, the symbolic assailant is troubling and
dangerous. If the Black man is the symbolic assailant, police may be
giving a pass to White criminals, and police may also be turning off
some particularized crime fighting knowledge.
Our lack of alarm in response to recent police violence says
something important about who the police have become in the
twenty-first century United States. The increasing number of
unarmed Blacks killed by police suggests that as a society, we have
ceded to the police the power to wield deadly force with significant
discretion. Police killings of the marginalized with little explanation
are a sign of far greater police influence than we have previously
acknowledged. Our focus on the Black symbolic assailant diverts our
attention from the fact that police officers are killing unarmed White
civilians too, just not as frequently. These deaths are frequently not
reported in the mainstream media. For all of our sake, I hope we will
examine whether the bargain we have made with police forces is
worth it.
418. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary, NATION (Jan. 31, 2002),
https://www.thenation.com/article/miners-canary/.
419. Id.
420. See RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD
CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 50 (2010) ("These divergent communities of color reflect the
entrenched inequalities found in a racially structured society in which whites are highly privileged
compared to other populations.").

